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A few years ago it became apparent that 
democratization processes in East and Central Europe (ECE) 
diverges; both facade and consolidated democracies emerged. 
There are several implications of this new dividing line in 
Europe; this thesis focuses on the security consequences. 
Why did some democratic processes become successful, and 
others did not? What went wrong and what are the lessons 
learned? Experiences learned from democratic consolidations 
and the preceding transition period in ECE are useful not 
only in the further democratization in the region, but also 
in other parts of the world. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The democratization processes in Eastern and Central 
Europe has diverges: facade democracies and consolidated 
democracies emerged. This thesis focuses on the security 
consequences of this new dividing line in Europe. 
Why did some democratic processes become successful, 
and others did not? What went wrong and what are the 
lessons learned? Might they be useful for future democratic 
consolidations? 
This thesis suggests that since strengthening 
democratization has positive results on the stability of 
the region, resources must be used effectively in order to 
guarantee European stability for all. This effectiveness is 
still missing from the decision-making process to 
consolidate democracies. The European Union's Stability 
Pact initiative is the first well-grounded, effective 
targeted effort in aiding the democratization process. 
Experiences learned from the democratic 
consolidations, and the preceding transition period 
especially in Eastern and Central Europe, might be useful 
XI 
not only in the further democratization of countries in the 
region, but also in other parts of the world. 
There is a proposed U.S. law in May 2001 to strengthen 
democracy  in  Cuba  by  sending  dissidents  money  and 
equipment. U.S. Senators Jesse Helms and Joseph Lieberman 
introduced  legislation  to  provide  $100  million  in 
assistance to dissident and other nongovernmental groups in 
Cuba over a period of four years. The legislation would 
authorize  the president  to  send cash,  food,  medicine, 
telephones, fax machines and other items to nongovernmental 
groups in Cuba, which would then distribute the aid. Is it 
impossible to implement this plan as opposition leaders on 
the Communist island have said, or not? If not, how will 
these efforts contribute to the weakening of the regime, 
and what will be the consequences?  In 1996,  Hungarian 
members  of  the  Parliament  had  secret  meetings  with 
representatives of the Cuban reform movement to examine the 
Hungarian transition to democracy, which might support and 
stabilize a possible future systemic change. More recently, 
Czech politicians  were  arrested  in  Cuba  for  the  same 
reason. 
This  thesis  focuses  on the  important  elements  of 
consolidating democracies and their security consequences. 
xii 
Why are parliamentary systems more effective? Why are 
central-right governments in a better position in the 
democratization and stabilization process of the region? 
Why are economic preconditions more vital in Eastern and 
Central Europe than anywhere else? Case studies have 
examined the experiences of democratization processes. This 
thesis also examines what went wrong and how to reverse 
negative processes. To better understand them, the author 
usually examines them at the sub-state level including such 
topics as tendencies in societies, and personalities of the 
leaders. 
XI11 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Ten years after the collapse of communism and the 
first free democratic elections in Eastern and Central 
Europe, the successes and failures of the democratic 
consolidation and their security consequences for the 
countries of the region are apparent. Each of these 
countries has made significant changes in the functions of 
the state: new political orientations; new economic 
policies; and new international relations. New inter- and 
intra-state boundaries have been created, while new 
internal and external problems and threats have arisen. 
This thesis examines the three outcomes of domestic 
systemic changes. These are the successful transitions, 
which created true democracies in some countries of the 
region; the unfinished transitions, which resulted in 
fagade democracies; and the failed transitions of the new 
authoritarian regimes. This analysis, however, is not an 
overall assessment of these different processes, but 
focuses on the main reasons for the failures and the 
resulting regional security consequences. 
With the collapse of the socialist systems in the 
communist  part  of  Europe,  the  West  linked  the  future 
1 
security of the region to the effectiveness of the 
democratic consolidation and the stability of the new- 
democracies. Therefore, mature Western democracies made 
huge efforts, and even significant financial contributions 
to strengthen the infant democratic institutions and state 
structures. Ten years have passed and a lot of work has 
been done, but these countries, are still far from being 
stable democracies. We must understand the reasons why. Our 
accumulated knowledge makes it possible to assess and give 
suggestions about the democratization processes. The last 
ten years have proven that outcomes of the reforms could be 
very different. Successful democracies can emerge, new 
authoritarian regimes can be born, or quasi-democracies can 
exist for a long time. 
This analysis, based on the different experiences of 
the countries of the region, gives a useful tool in 
weakening authoritarian regimes and promoting stable 
democracies. In 1996, Hungarian members of the Parliament 
had secret meetings with the representatives of the Cuban 
reform leaders to examine the Hungarian transition to 
democracy, which might support and stabilize a possible 
future systemic change in Cuba. More recently, Czech 
politicians were arrested in Cuba for the same reason. The 
aim of the thesis is to review the most important 
experiences and academic theories about what western 
democracies should or should not do to strengthen 
democracies, if such a comparable political change from an 
authoritarian or totalitarian regime into democracy is 
possible. The countries of Eastern Europe also can learn 
from these cases of successful transitions, and follow 
their examples in the future. 
Although this thesis uses many theories from 
comparative politics, it also connects these results to 
security issues. How is this done? 
A state and sub-state level analysis is used in the 
thesis to better understand the region and its stability 
problems. The international level of analysis is not 
capable of providing an adequate description of the 
problems: the future of European security is less likely to 
depend on NATO-Russian cooperation or landmine treaties for 
example, and more on the Lukasenkos, Iliescus, and 
Zirinovskys, their perceptions and regional, domestic 
policy issues. There are examples included from 
contemporary developments in these countries, which can be 
interpreted as internally destabilizing, and since they are 
closely linked, especially in this region to such issues as 
3 
minorities, the environment or economics, they also involve 
threats to external stability. 
This in-depth analysis is key to better understand the 
region. No predictions, security analysis or investment 
plans can be made without it. Stable democracies are 
essential for the stability of the region. A new 
authoritarian regime, or a return to the old systems, would 
create a very complicated and dangerous situation, and the 
chance of this re-emergence of new non-democratic forms of 
state is likely high. Eastern Europe is on the edge, and 
not only its own future depends on the effectiveness of 
democratic change but that of the entire region and 
possibly the world as well. 
II. SHORT HISTORY OF THE EAST AND CENTRAL EUROPEAN 
DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESSES AND THEIR SECURITY 
CONSEQUENCES 
A.   SECURITY IN THE NEW ERA 
Academic publications about the origins of the failure 
of communism in Central and Eastern Europe give broad and 
detailed descriptions of the destructive processes that 
resulted in a new disorder by the end of the 1980s. Leading 
transition and democratization theorists suggest that 1985 
should  be  considered  as  the  turning  point  of  the 
democratization   processes.   When   Gorbachev   and   his 
supporters became convinced that the Soviet Union was in a 
stage of dangerous stagnation requiring deep restructuring1, 
the most reluctant communist satellites,  Hungary,  Poland 
and   Czechoslovakia,   since   1956,   1981,   and   1968 
respectively, had gained the most important stimulation for 
their long suppressed desire for self-determination and 
democratization.  With  "perestroika"  and  "glasnost",  the 
possibility  for military and political  intervention  in 
Eastern and Central Europe significantly decreased. From as 
1
 There are numerous reasons why communism failed. It is not intended to 
examine these in details. A wide range of studies details all the economic, 
political, social and cultural consequences of the planned economy and one 
party system, such as the huge defense expenditures (23 percent in the USSR) , 
the lack of competition, the low R+D with relative high consumption, the role 
of the West in weakening these regimes, and the apathy of the people. These are 
just small vectors, but all lead in the same direction of system failure. 
early  as  November  1986,  Eastern  and  Central  European 
communist leaders were told that the Soviet Union would not 
use force to uphold their rule.2  The reason for this was 
that the Soviet Union had lost its legitimacy to stop the 
reform  communists  or  resurgent  civil  society  in  the 
satellite countries. Earlier, Soviet troops were "asked" to 
intervene,   which  made  it  legitimate  to  stop  the 
revolutions3, but the success of perestroika and glasnost 
had priority. The survival of communism itself depended on 
reforms,  which established the system's new limitations. 
Robert Dahl stated this important factor in his famous 
axiom: "the cost of intervention was greater than the cost 
of toleration."4 With the disappearance of the legitimacy of 
Soviet intervention, by the end of 1988, only two factors 
remained which could have altered the democratization in 
the satellites.   These were the leaders of the communist 
regime in the given country, or the hard liners in Moscow 
in case of Gorbachev's fall. From that time onward, the 
"Gorbachev gravely underestimated how illegitimate and unpopular many of 
the regimes were and how destabilizing the combination of his statements in 
favor of glasnost and perestroika and against Soviet military intervention 
would be." Linz and Stephan: "Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation" (p. 242). 
3
 Politically, it became official ideology with the Brezhnev Doctrine in 
1968: "The sovereignty of independent socialist countries can not be set 
against the interest of world socialism and the world revolutionary movement" 
(Mark Kremer: "Beyond the Brezhnev Doctrine: A new Era in Soviet-East 
Relations?" International Security, Winter, 1989-90). 
4
 Robert Dahl: "Polyarcy: Participation and Opposition" (Yale University 
Press, 1971) . 
outcome of democratization in each country depended mostly 
on internal developments. 
The events of the transitions unfolded in a fortunate 
manner, and the Eastern and Central European process is a 
more or less successful part of the fourth wave of 
democratization. In the last decade, several studies have 
analyzed all aspects of the systemic changes in the new, 
infant democracies. None of these analyses, at the same 
time, forget to mention the fact that euphoric 
expectations, which predicted a great new era with 
democratic transition, and calm, balanced, peaceful 
development, quickly became illusions rather than probable 
futures. These visions had resulted in the same optimism 
among security analysts. Fukuyama's argument that 
democracy's extension was leading to "the end of history" 
and the "diminution of the likelihood of large-scale 
conflict  between  states"5  was  based  on  the  xPeaceful 
5
 Francis Fukuyama: "The End of History?", National Interest 16,  (Summer, 
1989. p. 18.) 
Democracies'  theory,  and  overall  was  accepted  by  the 
academic world.6 
The proposition that democracies are more peaceful in 
general was first put forth by 18th century German 
philosopher Immanuel Kant, who observed: "citizens... will 
have a great hesitation in... calling down on themselves all 
the miseries of war."7 Bruce Russett plumbed the democratic 
peace theory with statistical tests, and found that "the 
more democratic [two states are] the less likely is 
conflict between them."8 He also found, that while 
democracies rarely fight one another, they often go to war 
against authoritarian regimes.9 
6
 George Kennan made a quite contrary claim, stating, that once it made up 
its mind, "a democracy...!ights in anger to the bitter end", but is quick to 
compromise and to forgive (Kennan: American Diplomacy, 1900-1950. p.59). 
Gottfried and Buchanan have both cited democratic England's declaration of war 
against democratic Finland in WWII, but no fighting ensued between them, 
therefore this formal act proves the rule. (Joshua Muravcik: "Promoting Peace 
Through Democracy" in "Managing Global Chaos", US. Institute of Peace, 1999. p. 
574.) The commitment of democratic Lebanon in the Israel-Arab conflict of 1948 
gives another example of peaceful democracies. Lebanon did only a little 
fighting, since it was dragged into the conflict by its authoritarian allies. 
7
 Cited in Michael W. Doyle: "Liberalism and World Politics" (p.1160), 
American Political Science Review (December, 1986). 
8
 Russett: "Grasping the Democratic Peace" (p.86), Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1993). Colonialism is a great example of this. The 
European powers conquered most of Africa and Asia and continued to hold their 
prizes as Europe democratized. This democratization process just strengthens 
the "peaceful democracies" theory: colonialism was a legacy of Europe's pre- 
democratic times, and it was abandoned after WWII. 
9
 The problem with this, and other similar statements is that they do not 
examine the question of who started or caused the war. Therefore, the Gulf War, 
for example, besides the American interests other than promoting and defending 
stability, does not contradict the peaceful democracies theory. 
8 
In history, there has been no case where liberal 
democracies have initiated warfare without significant 
provocation or for reasons of sheer aggrandizement.10 Please 
note, however, that it is important to distinguish mature, 
well-consolidated liberal democracies from other facade 
ones which are electoral or delegative in nature. This 
recognition is clearly made by Edward G. Mansfield and Jack 
Snyder, who claim statistical support for the proposition 
that while fully-fledged democracies may be pacific, "in 
the transitional phase of democratization, countries become 
more aggressive and war-prone, not less."11 
Based on this theoretical approach of 'peace-making', 
stability in those regions where democracies are not 
consolidated might be successfully guaranteed with further 
democratization. The Eastern and Central European 
experiences in the last decade also prove the relevance of 
the peaceful democracies theory, both from negative and 
positive perspectives. The most successful countries enjoy 
(three of them are even members of NATO) and contribute to 
10
 Juan Linz states that these democracies are the form of government least 
likely to violate human rights, but they may do so under stress or when 
confronted with terrorist or antisystem challenges. They need to act early and 
creatively to meet potential challenges if they are to preserve their liberal 
character. Linz: "Types of Political Regime and Respect for Human Rights: 
Historical and Cross-National Perspectives", Scandinavian University Press, 
1996), p. 186. 
11
 Mansfield and Snyder: "Democratization and War", Foreign Affairs, no.3. 
(May-June 1995). 
the stability and security of the region, while others 
faced or still face internal and external conflicts. This 
difference originates from the multi-paced democratization 
process, which created a new dividing line in Europe during 
the last ten years. 
It can be said that Europe today is a geographically 
defined continent consisting of nation states, sharing (a) 
a common history of different cultures and languages, (b) 
universal norms of civilization, human values and (c) a 
leading but not homogenous religion (Christianity). They 
are an economic and political entity of democratic and 
secular countries under an inward and outward unification 
process. 
Due to some of these particulars, Europe has always 
been, and still is divided. This multi-paced 
democratization process, which means a different efficiency 
in democratic consolidation in the relevant countries, is 
happening today. The new Central Europe12, formed by Poland, 
the Czech Republic,  Slovakia,  Hungary,  Slovenia and the 
12
 A decade after the hegemonic and ideological division of Europe, just 
like during the Cold War, the terms of "Western", "Central" and "Eastern" 
Europe are emotional, and not geographical attributions, reflecting the 
democratic "gap" among these regions. This is clearly expressed, although 
arguable by all the comparative politics theorists: "Freedom levels recede as 
one moves east and south... As one moves toward the rim of the former Soviet 
Union... elections themselves become increasingly hollow and noncompetitive." 
Larry Diamond: "Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation", p. 53-54, The Johns 
Hopkins University, 1999. 
10 
Baltic States could transform into stable democracies, 
while countries of the Eastern and South-Eastern part of 
the continent still face different difficulties during 
their systemic change. 
B.   THE SUCCESSFUL TRANSITIONS 
The democracies of the world are counted every year by 
different organizations and publications, based on 
electoralism, i.e., on the minimal precondition of "free 
elections". Even the simple fact that the number of 
democracies may change year by year shows the absurdity of 
this approach. Electoralism as a definition of democracy 
cannot avoid leaving a "gray zone" of "dubious" democracies 
against "genuine" democracies with "fairly elected 
governments." To avoid the trap of electoralism with facade 
democracies, Bingham Powell has introduced the term of 
"working democracies" with a set of precise preconditions13. 
Based on factors other than free and fair elections14, 
Freedom House annually rates political rights and civil 
liberties for the nations of the world, using a seven point 
Bingham Powell: "Contemporary Democracies, Participation, Stability and 
Violence" (Cambridge, Mass.-London: Harvard U. P., 1982, pp. 3-4). 
14
 These factors construe numerous characteristics of the given state, like 
minority rights, women in the society, individual freedoms... These factors are 
not constant. As democracy penetrates into new areas the Freedom House adopts 
them. In their latest assessment, the freedom of the Internet was introduced as 
a new factor. 
11 
scale system.15 The Eastern and Central European processes 
in the last ten years resulted in different outcomes (See 
Appendix A) . The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are 
the most successful countries in this transition process, 
but others, such as Slovenia, Slovakia and the Baltic 
States, are also ranked as 'free' countries by Freedom 
House. Democratic evolution has always included some back 
and forth movements, rather than a smooth progression. 
During the euphoric years of the 90s, many theorists argued 
the faster the better, but this idea has failed. 
Freedom scores of the most successful ECE countries 
during the last ten years have radically decreased (the 
smaller number means more democracy), reflecting their 
achievement in the consolidation process. Which components, 
however, result in success, and which ones are preventive? 
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan identified "five 
reinforcing arenas of a modern consolidated democratic 
polity concerning civil society, political society, rule of 
law, the state apparatus and economic society."16 Are these 
arenas  also  weakening  consolidated,  totalitarian  and 
15
 Number 1 indicates the most free and 7 the least free. Under 2.5, the 
given country is considered free, between 3 and 5.5 partly free, and between 
5.5 and 7 "not free". Http://www.freedomhouse.org. 
16
 Linz and Stepan: "Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation" 
(p. 244), Hopkins University Press, 1996. 
12 
authoritarian regimes? How important are transition periods 
(first  phase)  to  well-grounded  consolidations  (second 
phase)? 
From this prospective, in the embryonic period of 
these democracies, the prospect for a successful transition 
depended on a limited liberalism of the system17. In 
Hungary, when the Hungarian Working People's Party, which 
was the name of the ruling party after the absorption of 
Social Democratic Party, and the remaining bigger parties, 
such as the Independent Smallholders' Party and the 
National Peasant Party, as well as the big social 
organizations such as the Trade Union Federation, the 
Association of the Working Peasants, the Democratic Women's 
Association and the Federation of the Working Youth, were 
merged into the Hungarian People's Independence Front in 
194 9, all formal legal features of the previous multiparty 
system disappeared. In Czechoslovakia, the National Front 
incorporated the remaining parties of the Czechoslovak 
Socialist Party, the Czechoslovak People's Party, the 
Slovak Reconstruction Party and the Slovak Freedom Party, 
and the trade unions as well as the youth and other social 
17
 Communism was not totally suppressive everywhere. There were, although 
limited in numbers, participants, other than the Communist Party, which could 
influence the decision-making processes (Academy of Sciences, Economic 
University...) specially in Poland and Hungary. 
13 
organizations under the leadership of the Communist Party 
of Czechoslovakia. However,  these parties retained their 
social and political existence and would later play a role 
during the democratic transition. This was even more so in 
Poland,  where the multiparty system had its most open 
manifestation  in  the  Eastern  and  Central  European 
countries. The 1983 Constitution defined the position of 
the  political  parties  as  follows:  "The  alliance  and 
cooperation of the Polish United Worker's Party with the 
United Peasant  Party and the Democratic  Party in the 
construction of socialism and their cooperation with those 
social organizations and associations that are grounded in 
the  principles  of  the  system  of  the  Polish  People's 
Republic  form the  basis  of  the  Patriotic  Movement  of 
National Renaissance."18 The PRON, previously the National 
Unity Front, played the role of the umbrella organization 
in Poland, but the parties had more social and political 
functions and visibility than in other countries, so their 
role was also more marked in the long political transition. 
Although communist regimes in these three countries 
were hegemonic, the limited democracy gave some minor and 
fragile autonomy for the Civil Society (first arena of Linz 
18
 The Statesman's Yearbook, 122nd edition (edited by J. Paxton), London: 
Macmillan, 1985, p. 993. 
14 
and Stephan)  and a possibility for a political opening. 
This is the main reason why there could be a turn towards 
democracy. In the beginning, informal political groupings 
and emergent organizations were defined around ideological 
and interpersonal questions rather than in terms of a 
struggle between the ruling elite and its opposition. These 
groups did not directly attack the ruling elites, but by 
raising  consciousness,  they  effectively  undermined  the 
legitimacy of  the  regime  and deepened the anti-regime 
feelings  of  the population.19 The Hungarian and Polish 
examples prove that democratic change does not necessary 
originate from political or ideological opposition or the 
Political Society itself (second arena), but that there are 
other factors which might hurt the non-democratic elite 
(raising consciousness within religious groups in China). 
Later, of course, human rights and democratic freedoms were 
the central ideological demands of the opposition, but non- 
ideological   and   non-political   debates   significantly 
weakened the communist regime. These experiences prove that 
the western policy of criticizing human rights issues in 
China, North Korea, Cuba, or other countries will not be 
19
 In Hungary for instance, organized monthly cultural programs, fund 
raising activities to distribute them to the poor, environmentalist movements 
against the planned dam on the Danube and new highways through living areas 
raised the population's consciousness and demand for more democratic decision 
making. 
15 
effective without using the principle of gradualism and the 
strengthening20 of the internal democratic forces of the 
Civil Society. 
The slow process of democratization provided several 
advantages for Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, and it 
proved the irrelevance of the "faster the better" idea. 
First of all, there was enough time to "produce" new 
leaders who were real democratic "enthusiasts". The fact 
that transitions were in the hands of the intelligentsia 
guaranteed that the process of democratization in these 
countries was well considered, gradual and most of all 
stable, without any sign of violence21. Although much slower 
than in other countries of the region, this slow 
transformation also resulted in another important element 
of a stable democracy. The "no other alternative" principle 
concerning capitalism and democracy was well planted in the 
20
 Strengthening these democratic forces is not as hard as many analysts 
suppose. Radio Free Europe had significant results in weakening the regime, but 
the Semizdat culture, the "Flying Universities" and other domestic initiations 
were highly motivated. Networking opposition forces in the age of information 
technologies is also effective, because it increases their power. As early as 
1987, there were 10,000 people, and not only environmentalists of course, 
demonstrating in front of the Hungarian Parliament against building a dam on 
the Danube. Connecting opposition forces in the age of information technologies 
is very simple. 
21
 Reform parties, with changes in their support from the population of 
course, are still in the National Assemblies today, which provides one of the 
most important stabilizing factors of the successful democracies: the political 
elite is full of the guardians of democracy. In the case of Hungary, even the 
most nationalist force, the Hungarian Truth and Life Party, with 5% of the 
electoral votes in the Parliament, is led by Istvan Csurka, a key figure in the 
transition process. 
16 
people's mind, which determined their positive attitudes 
towards democratization and against extremist and non- 
democratic ideas. This sociologically deeper transformation 
of the population in the previous decades gave them a head 
start towards the transition and guaranteed stability later 
on. 
The next positive result of the slow reform is the 
increase in more democratic forces, parties and more 
charismatic leaders. Therefore, infant democracies became 
multiplayers in nature22, effectively preventing a new 
totalitarian or authoritarian regime. Bingham Powell has 
emphasized the close correlation between democracy and 
party systems: "a strong system of political parties is 
essential for a strong democracy."23 In the new wave of 
democratization, the experiences have shown that the 
particular  political   system   -   parliamentary  versus 
22 In many scholars' view, the reason why these countries chose 
parliamentary, instead of presidential systems is historical. Before communism, 
in the short-lived democracy, several parties participated in the political 
arena, which, with the weakening of the regime, reestablished themselves at the 
end of the eighties. However, the real reason is that the opposition had enough 
time to fragment based on their ideologies (liberalism, social-democratism, 
conservatism...) . 
23
 G. Bingham Powell: "Contemporary Democracies, Participation, Stability 
and Violence", Cambridge, Mass.-London: Harvard U. P., 1982, p. 7. 
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presidential - makes a big difference24. Those countries, 
which have succeeded in creating a working parliamentary 
democracy, have been consolidated25. The other ones, 
however, which have chosen the presidential way of 
transition, have failed (Ukraine, Belarus). For the ruling 
parties, the presidency was a model for maintaining a 
strong role in the face of parliamentary politics as in the 
cases of Byelorussia and the Ukraine. "Latin-American type" 
presidents with weak parliaments lead to submissive 
legislatures, facade democracies and finally to the 
breakdown of democracy. Strong parliaments and weak 
governments, in turn, can produce unstable, chaotic 
transition processes. 
The  issues  of  parliamentary  versus  presidential 
democracy and the right checks and balances therefore will 
24
 The advantage of a consensus democracy vs. majoritarian has been 
discussed in the 1980s, first of all by A. Lijphart: "The presidential election 
'game' has a zero-sum character, whereas a parliamentary system offers the 
possibility of dividing the outcomes. Parliamentary elections present many 
options: formation of coalition governments; cooperation between government and 
opposition in the legislative process, either overtly or covertly; and the 
potential gains by opposition parties in successive elections... This reduces the 
frustrations of the loser, creates expectations for the future, and often 
allows the loser a share in power. In the presidential system, in which the 
winner of a plurality of 33.1 percent gains control of the executive office... 
the opposition is likely to feel impotent and even enraged." Cited in Attila 
Agh: "The parliamentary way to democracy the case of Hungary", Budapest Papers 
on Democratic Transition No. 2. 1991. 
25
 The presidential elections are not direct elections in most of the 
successful reform countries such as in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia. Only in Poland and Slovenia do people and not the 
legislatures elect the president. At the same time, a strong government and a 
prime minister is not an overall solution in the case of the powerful Slovakian 
Prime Minister Meciar for instance. The emphasis is on the right checks and 
balances. 
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be, no doubt, decisive also for the fate of the emerging 
democracies in Eastern and Central Europe and in the Third 
World. The successful countries could fulfill these two 
tasks in different ways. In Hungary, the goal of the 
agreement between the parliamentary parties was to 
stabilize the new democracy and make governability 
smoother. Therefore, the scope of the legislation requiring 
a two-thirds majority in the Parliament was significantly 
reduced, so the government strengthened significantly 
relative to the parliament. Second, they agreed to the 
election of the President of the Republic by the 
Parliament, which created a weak presidency. 
Of course, multiparty systems need parties. The most 
difficult, but very important compromise between the ruling 
elite and the opposition was to establish the legal 
framework for these new parties. This meant the end of the 
one-party system26, and only the Hungarian and the Polish 
cases offer such a characteristic of democratic change. 
With this document, it became more advantageous for all the 
political actors to get registered as parties and not to 
remain socio-political organizations of any other type. The 
26
 At a relatively early date, in October 1989 a law was passed by the 
Hungarian parliament regulating the workings and finances of parties. This law 
provided a legal framework for giving substantial financial assistance to all 
registered parties according to the size of memberships. Scholars refer to this 
event as the "death warrant" of the communist parties, signed by themselves. 
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Situation of the new parties, in general, was worsened by 
the small groups of emigres returning home with the 
"radical" slogans of the elderly who had been isolated from 
their native countries for decades and had outdated, 
"frozen" ideas, but sought revenge and recompensation27. 
These "few men shows" created many marginal mini-parties, 
jaded political life, and in most cases, deterred people 
from politics. 
The most obvious problem with "controlled" transitions 
was that elite-parties were too far from the population, 
and therefore, the first democratic elections created a new 
elite - although democratic in nature -, rather than the 
people's rule. The genetic defect of the new party systems 
was that almost all parties claimed to represent the whole 
nation directly and without any attention being paid to 
special interests groups, strata and classes. Therefore, 
they were exclusionist and over-competitive, faceless 
enough to the population to not identify with a solid 
party, which increased the level of apathy of the 
population towards politics. Parties have evolved since and 
created their "faces" representing their voters, but for a 
27
 The role of immigrants in the systemic change is one of the most 
important undiscovered research areas, which should provide further lessons. 
There are large Cuban, Vietnamese, Chinese immigrant populations, and their 
role in the transition or consolidation process would be decisive. 
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couple of years, they could not really manage their 
penetration into the social life by mobilizing the masses 
into their parties or by engaging in a dialogue with 
different strata and classes. The "movement-party", which 
is a term used widely in the political science literature 
for Poland and the former Czechoslovakia, expresses also 
the contradiction that these huge national liberation 
movements could mobilize the population for national 
priorities  but  not   for particular party  interests. 
After the first democratic elections, the survivors 
reacted angrily, essentially in all cases. They turned 
fiercely against all the other actors, parties or political 
organizations of any type. They monopolized the political 
scene legally-constitutionally by establishing prerogatives 
for the parliamentary parties, concentrated all the 
resources in their own hands, and secured their privileged 
access to the media, knowing all too well that visibility 
and publicity are the crucial issues for the new parties. 
Although        it eliminated        the        biggest        danger        of 
overfragmentation  for  the   emerging party  system28,   which  was 
At the end of 1991 in Czechoslovakia, there were 79 registered parties, 
out of which 29 were active in the whole country. In Hungary, at the end of 
1989 about 120 parties, out of which 66 registered and finally six have become 
parliamentary parties. On the contrary, the overfragmented polish party system 
after the elections began a coalition-building exercise to unify some parties. 
After the parliamentary elections, 29 parties and groupings took their seats in 
the Sejm and the formation of a  stable government became a  fundamental problem. 
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only lessened by and after the elections in the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Poland and solved only in Hungary, 
this cruel natural selection of the political organizations 
was necessary and unavoidable (it endangered the stability 
of the government, as it happened in Romania - see later) 
but excessive and counter-productive. The selfishness of 
the parliamentary parties and their eagerness to become the 
only actors in the political game isolated them even more 
from  their  societies29.  As  another  consequence,  this 
"political cleansing" hardens the acceptance of the defeat, 
which  is  a  key  issue  in  stabilizing  democracies.  It 
increased the  frustrations of  the losers of the  first 
elections,  forcing  them  to  use  the  same  method  of 
unfairness to protect themselves. 
It is more threatening, however, that since these 
parties were so weak in the social "wilderness", they 
preferred their privileged existence in the parliament, 
turning it into a political theater of sensational 
political fights. It not just significantly weakens its 
effectiveness, and thereby jeopardizes the democratic 
consolidation (see the Romanian case later) , but in the 
29
 As a result of this, and the distance between the elite and the 
population, in 1990 the most frequent answer for the question "Why you have 
interest in politics?" in Hungary was that "I have interest in politics because 
of my worsening standard of living." (56 per cent) and only 8 per cent answered 
with a general interest in politics. 
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worst-case scenario, the parliament is unable to fulfill 
one of its most important tasks, which is that of 
representing all segments of the population. This can lead 
to instability and civil wars. (See the Moldovan case in 
Chapter II.) 
Moreover, re-establishing the legislature is a very 
significant factor for Eastern and Central European 
democratization. It could be said that democratization 
equals parliamentarization. During the communist regimes, 
the National Assemblies played a very limited "puppet show" 
role, and were subordinated to the ruling party. After the 
first elections, parliaments started to work, and tried to 




The legislative function, first of all in the 
constitution, makes and establishes the rules of 
the game for the entire transition process and 
consolidated democracy 
The controlling function plays its role in the 
distribution of powers and mutual balancing in 
order to prevent the rise of the new power 
monopoly 
The conflict management function is particularly 
important in the period of acute conflicts and 
their cumulative effects and in the absence of 
the effective institutions and procedures of 
conflict resolution 
The socialization function, which instructs the 
new elite after its recruiting process, provides 
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an "arena" for its selection and establishes the 
rules of behavior 
• The legitimization function may be the most 
important since the new democratic regimes have 
emerged from a "legitimization gap or vacuum" and 
the new political actors have legitimated 
themselves mutually by accepting and elaborating 
on the parliamentary framework of the democracy, 
and building a bridge, at the same time, to the 
population 
The first years for the legislatures were hectic, and 
the effectiveness of the legislatures had serious 
consequences during the process of strengthening the 
democracies (between 1990 and 1992, the Hungarian 
Parliament made 134 laws, 128 amendments, 220 resolutions). 
Democracy and a market economy need new rules and 
regulations to follow as soon as possible. However, this 
"sooner the better" is relevant only in the consolidation 
period of building democracies. 
Although parliaments were real 'law-factories', the 
governments, even when empowered against their legislatures 
in order to be effective, failed to solve the tremendous 
problems of the economy, which formed the most dangerous 
threat to the young democracy and had serious consequences. 
This economic threat will be discussed in Chapter III. 
During the years following the first elections, and 
when  establishing  the  basic  elements,  regulations,  and 
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institutions of the new democracies, the governments had to 
face the problems of further consolidating and 
strengthening their state structures. It is a long process 
to reach to a well functioning liberal democracy, which 
means a longer period of uncertainness but at the same 
time, it ensures the irreversibility of democratization. In 
1999, the U.S. closed down its SEED (Support for Eastern 
European Democracy) program for Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania, believing these countries had reached the 
highest level of democracy30. 
By the millennium, these most successful transition 
countries are internally and externally, politically and 
economically stable democracies, contribute to the 
stability of Europe, and try to promote further 
democratization. Their politicians help other governments 
of the region through their experience and knowledge, which 
should significantly contribute to the effectiveness of the 
consolidation funds provided by the West. Their 
democratization processes are irreversible; they are on 
their way to integrate into the western institutions, most 
importantly the EU and NATO. 
Freedom House also rates these countries as liberal democracies. See 
Appendix A. 
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Although there are several problems, the consolidation 
process has created stability for these countries so far. 
Only  minor  corrections  are  necessary,  such  as  the 
arrangement of the status of the state owned broadcasting 
stations which culminated in the "media crisis"  in the 
Czech Republic and Hungary last month, or the resolution of 
the situation of the gypsies31 in the region.  The most 
important task is to identify those possible changes, which 
could promote further consolidation, such as transforming 
the Hungarian Parliament from unicameral to bicameral in 
nature, as in Poland or Czech-Slovakia in order to better 
represent different kinds of minorities on the national, 
cultural, or religious level, and also those of organized 
interests. As their financial revenues allow, they should 
promote the new technologies,  to strengthen their civil 
society and introduce the information society in order to 
ensure a better resource allocation, fast information flow 
to   the   highest   policy-makers   and  between  groups, 
associations,  political parties.  They must allow greater 
independence for the local governments, which also results 
in the political consciousness of the population. In one 
word: their task is to spread democracy in all segments of 
31
 France, giving political refugee status for a dozen gypsies leaving 
Hungary because of police abuse last month, signaled that the West requires 
more responsible behavior from mature democracies. 
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life. They are and will be judged upon many more democratic 
criteria than the less successful ones, like the EU 
harmonization (legal, environmental, labor, market... laws 
adaptations), which will further promote their democratic 
change. 
C.   FACADE DEMOCRACIES AND NEW AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 
In  the  East  and  Central  European  countries,  the 
general impression is just the opposite of the previous 
democratization  experiences   (Latin  America,   Southern 
Europe).  The transition period  (1980-1990)  is the most 
difficult and vulnerable and the consolidation period can 
be relatively short and easy,  if it is careful,  well- 
grounded reform.  This seems to be relevant  for future 
transition processes, therefore any experiences, successes 
and failures will give useful guidance both in weakening 
non-democratic regimes and guiding reform countries towards 
stable  democracies.  As  the  different  cases  of  post- 
communist countries proved, while there are various ways to 
transition power, the period following the strengthening of 
democratic  institutions  has  common  particulars  and 
procedures. 
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Larry Diamond argues that the very minimal requirement 
which makes democratic consolidation possible is an era 
where 
no significant collective actors challenge the 
legitimacy of democratic institutions or 
regularly violate its constitutional norms, 
procedures and laws... Antidemocrats must be truly 
marginal.32 
Huntington has the same point of view: 
...serious threat to democracy is executive 
arrogation, which occurs when an elected chief 
executive concentrates power in his own hands, 
subordinates or even suspends the legislature, 
and rules largely by decree. This has happened in 
some measure in Russia, in Belarus...33 
Furthermore, Diamond revealed that other actors also 
play key roles. He consequently believes that consolidation 
takes place in the two dimensions of norms and behavior on 
three levels.  The elite level which is the crucial role in 
signaling what kinds of behavior are proper and improper, 
the parties,  organizations and movements level,  and the 
mass public level. Analyzing the East and Central European 
changes, it is obvious that these factors are crucial in 
the transitions. The main argument of many analysts is that 
the growing democratic gap between the first, successful 
32
 Larry Diamond: "Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation", p. 67. The 




and the second, facade groups of democracies34 originates 
from the different perceptions of the three levels 
identified by Diamond. 
From this point of view, the former elite's power 
transformation to the new system is a key issue in the 
democratization process. In Eastern and Central Europe, the 
communist elite, the leaders, high-ranking bureaucrats, 
officials, directors of state owned firms everywhere tried 
to adapt and save their power, survive the changes, and 
their positions combined with the weaknesses of the infant 
democracies could ensure the success in doing so. The most 
decisive factor in this power "transportation" was the 
efficiency and the duration of the transition itself. One 
should assume that fast, radical revolutionary changes 
result in an effective, deep reorganization, but the 
outcomes in Eastern and Central Europe were quite 
contradictory. It is certain that slow processes resulted 
in positive outcomes, while fast changes did not. 
The way representatives of state-socialist leading 
groups were replaced varied from country to country in the 
years of 1989/90. The old ruling elite, the "nomenclatura", 
Facade democracies are those post-communist countries, which are ranked 
as illiberal democracies by the Freedom House. See under "Transitional 
Governments" in Appendix A. 
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under state socialism, was driven out of its political 
positions in Eastern and Central Europe with different 
efficiency. In the emerged facade democracies, parts of the 
old state and party apparatus have exchanged old positions 
for those under the new order. Although there were radical 
cutbacks among the upper and medium strata of the old 
political elite, and legal actions to prevent the 
usurpation of power and corruption were taken in several 
transition countries35, where considerable changes failed, 
facade democracies emerged. 
The negative developments in 1989/90 has allowed 
different groups of politicians at local, regional and 
state levels to reach solid positions. Many of them were 
not Diamond's dream democrats, and their expulsion from 
power is the latest challenge the fagade democracies face 
today (in Byelorussia and the Ukraine for example)36. It is 
important to see how positive changes might be reached or 
35
 Sanctions concerning professional career and social provisions of former 
members of the power wielding apparatus were adopted in Czechoslovakia 
(Lustration Law), East Germany/GDR (Treaty on German Unity with reference to 
Civil Service) or without any legal limitations, the new leadership itself 
prevented it by re-institutionalization. The power transition of the old elite 
is a key issue in democratic transitions and consolidations. However no 
detailed studies were written about the effects, successes or failures of these 
restriction policies. Facade democracies did not have these kinds of legal 
restrictions, or they were created too late (Romania) or not implemented 
properly (In Meciar's Slovakia, the Lustration Law was never taken seriously). 
36
 The common background of this drive to full power comes partly from the 
traditions and routines, the mentality and practice of the previous one-party 
system, but the main reason is that acquiring power is easy. The unregulated 
political arena offers unlimited chances for realizing interests. 
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enforced because there are many semi-presidential, or new 
authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe and the CIS, which 
needs further democratization. Democratic institutions can 
be improved and deepened or may need to be consolidated. 
Political competition can be made fairer and more open. 
Participation can become more inclusive and vigorous. 
Citizens' knowledge, resources and competence can grow. 
Elected and appointed officials can be made more responsive 
and accountable. Civil liberties can be better protected, 
and the rule of the law can become more efficient and 
secure. Facade democracies are not an enigma. They have 
quite a few characteristic features in common. One of the 
most important is that they contain a dynamic 
contradiction: they provide the basic structures and the 
possibility for the beginning of the long process to 
democratization. The cases of Romania and Slovakia nowadays 
are two good examples37. 
One can say that the fall of communism took ten years 
in Poland, ten months in Hungary, ten days in 
Czechoslovakia and ten hours in Romania. The length of the 
change,  as  discussed  above,  strongly  influences  the 
37
 Today, based on their freedom scores, these two countries are rated 
"free" and should not be listed in the category of facade democracies. However, 
their vulnerability (possibility for a turn-back) is high and they offer 
contemporary lessons in democratic consolidation. 
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effectiveness of the initial democratization process, 
though it does not necessarily pre-determines it. From the 
roots of the Czechoslovakian "velvet revolution", two 
absolutely different cases, the Czech success and the 
Slovakian failure have resulted. Contrary to the Czech, in 
the Romanian case, the length of the December revolution in 
1989 was rather deterministic; besides the expulsion of 
Ceausescu from power, there was no real democratic 
transition. "It is the only country where a former high 
Communist official was not only elected to the presidency 
in the first free election, but re-elected."38 
The revolutionary way to change systems has more 
negative than positive results, therefore in the future, 
promoting uprisings, anti-system movements or coup de etat 
must be very well considered. For instance, the immediate 
negative outcome of the Romanian revolution was chaos39, 
which should be avoided at any time of the transition 
process. This chaos made it possible for the Romanian old- 
38
 Linz and Stepan: "Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation" 
(p. 344) . They refer the May 1990 and the October 1992 elections, on which 
Iliescu (85 percent in 1990, 62 percent in 1992 of the presidential vote) and 
his National Salvation Front (66 percent in 1990 on the Parliamentary 
elections) won. Four years after publishing their book, in 2000, Iliescu won 
the third presidential election. 
39
 For instance, the lack and the manipulation of information flow (although 
the broadcasting stations were captured) worsened the chaotic situation. There 
were news about thousands of deaths of water poisoning by the Securitate, and 
uncertainty about the stand of the military. Chaos created fear, the loss of 
control and the alteration of the revolution. 
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communists, led by Iliescu to "capture the revolution" and 
form the Council of National Salvation (CNS) to transfer 
their power40. The lack of gradual change41 and of civil 
society42 also predetermined the outcome of the revolution. 
Other, pre-World War II parties, such as the National 
Liberal Party, the Peasant Party were quickly formed, but 
they could not claim their efforts in the revolution, while 
the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania -although it 
played a fundamental role everywhere during the revolution, 
specially in Timisoara, where it started- was easy prey to 
extreme nationalist  attacks. 
After       the       first       parliamentary      and      presidential 
elections43,      the     Romanian     and     Slovakian     democratization 
Codrescu refer to the Romanian coup as "scripted" revolution, which was 
not a democratic turn. Scholars agree, that the Romanian revolution was a 
change, a "downfall of the odious dictatorship of the Ceausescu clan" (from the 
CNS  Communique)   to a post-communist   facade democracy. 
The gradual change in Romania was not possible, the state controlled and 
suppressed any kind of reform endeavors. Bogdan Lefter, Romanian poet: "after 
1980 in Poland, after Gorbachev in 198S, and especially after the 1989 dominos, 
we felt we were an isolated case and that Ceausescu would never accept peaceful 
change." Cited in Linz and Stepan: "Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation",   The Johns Hopkins University Press,   1996,   p.   358. 
The number of independent movements was the lowest in Romania in 1989. 
There were only two of them, contrary to the 60 in Poland, 27 in Czechoslovakia 
and 21 in Hungary. (Linz and Stepan: "Problems of democratic transition and 
consolidation",   p.   352). 
43
   Won   by   the   National    Salvation   Front   by   66   percent   and   its   candidate, 
Iliescu as elected president by 85 percent. 
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processes had both positive and negative developments44. 
"Civil society remained incipient, the rule of law fragile, 
political   coalitions   turbulent   and  most   political 
tendencies  compromised"45,  and the economic difficulties 
also left their deep marks on the society46  (about the 
relation between  consolidation  and  economic  reform  see 
chapter III),  which gave the fundamentals for Iliescu's 
(and of his Party of Social Democracy) second victory in 
the  September  and  October  1992  elections,   further 
strengthening their positions. The Slovakian case has many 
parallels with the Romanian process.  The Czechoslovakian 
"velvet revolution" was also too short for a well-grounded 
careful transition,  and after 1968 the reform-communists 
were marginalized,  which allowed the communists to hold 
44
 From positive side for example, in Romania, gynecological 
experimentations were abolished, the razing of peasant villages was stopped, 
the schematization plan was scrapped, the typewriter registration law was 
repealed, passports available for everybody, while from the negative side, the 
National Salvation Front kept the media in its hand, Iliescu called the miners 
of the Jil valley to break down the protests of the students in Bucharest in 
1990, and forced the reformist Roman Petre led government to resign in 1991. 
45
 Linz and Stepan: "Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation" 
(pp. 362-363) . 
46
 The careful economic reform, pursed by the Romanian government was not 
effective, therefore in May, 1993, harsh measures became unavoidable: prices of 
the basic consumer goods have risen 700-900 percent, compensations decreased. 
It had far reaching consequences: a poll made by the Romanian Pollster 
Institute in December 1994 revealed, that more and more people longed for the 
former regime. 32 percent of the Romanians rejected the market economy, 34 
percent the western democracy against the fact that 57 percent of the 
population felt, that in Romania, still communists were ruling. 42 percent of 
the population felt no importance of revealing the secrets of the revolution, 
23 percent disapproved the overthrow Ceausescu's totalitarianism. In 1994, the 
most unpopular institutions were the Parliament and the Government, 77 and 72 
percent of the population was dissatisfied respectively. 62 percent 
disappointed in the judiciary system. (HVG CD collection, Keyword: "Roman 
kozvelemeny") 
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their strong positions. After the revolution, not just the 
civil society, but the political society has remained also 
underdeveloped. The two forces, the Czech Civic Forum and 
the Slovakian People Against Violence were the only 
influencing political actors to shape the process of 
democratization. The events unfolded in three years, and in 
1993 Czechoslovakia ceased to exist. In Slovakia, Meciar 
gained power. 
While history has- already witnessed political 
conversions from one extreme to the other, never before had 
the two "deadly enemies," the extreme left and the extreme 
right, overtly joined in the common struggle against their 
shared foe: individualism and democracy. In Romania, this 
could happen in 1992, Iliescu and his old communists pacted 
with the neo-communist Socialist Labor Party (PSM), Vadim 
Tudorvs chauvinist Greater Romania Party (PRM) and the 
anti-Hungarian, extreme nationalist Funar's Party of 
Romanian National Unity47. In Slovakia, just like in the 
Romanian case, the conservative nationalists gained power, 
although Meciar and his Movement for Democratic Slovakia 
(HZDS) had to govern in minority. A year later, in October 
1994,  the extreme  left and right  coalition emerged in 
4
  In January 1995, this governing coalition initiated an overall attack in 
order to suspend and forbid the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania. 
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Slovakia too: the HZDS formed a government with the 
nationalist Slovak National Party and the communist 
Workers' Association48. 
As argued before, long lasting negative outputs (both 
political and economic) result in defeat, this is what 
happened in the 1996 elections49 in Romania, and in 1998 in 
Slovakia. No ideology could guarantee post-communist and 
ultra nationalist victory again, although in both cases, 
the establishment of election cooperations (coalitions) of 
the democratic forces was necessary to win. In Slovakia, 
since the economy was in a much better situation - at least 
on the surface (the relative well being of the people was 
financed from loans) - and Meciar's measures ensured their 
advantages50, the HZDS won the parliamentary elections (with 
27 percent) again, but remained without coalition partners. 
4
° The coalition agreements between the two extremes interestingly made the 
cooperation possible in some of the areas: the Minister of Privatization in 
Slovakia for example, was delegated by the left wing; of course the Marxist 
idea of state owned firms was highly compatible with the nationalists' 
protectionist economic policy. 
49
 In "Clash of Civilizations", Samuel P. Huntington draws the border of the 
western civilization through Romania, with Transylvania on the western and the 
rest of Romania on the Eastern side. The result of the 1996 elections proves 
his theory: In Transylvania, except two counties, Constantinescu and the 
democrats, while in the orthodox Eastern part, the post-communist Iliescu and 
the ultra-nationalist collected most of the votes. 
50
 For instance, in May 1998, the Parliament adopted Meciar's new election 
law, which forced coalitions (all parties had to reach 5 percent to get into 
the parliament, but in failing to do so, the party's result would be deleted 
from the coalition's result) but forbid the establishment of a joint list of 
candidates. Contrary, when the opposition could unite their forces, Meciar 
tried to prohibit the registration of the Democratic Coalition, which formed 
the next government later. 
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Therefore,  the Slovak Democratic Coalition could form a 
government. In Romania, the winning Democratic Convention51 
(in coalition with the Hungarian Democratic Alliance and 
the Social Democratic Union) and the new president, Emil 
Constantinescu   clearly   won   the   parliamentary   and 
presidential  elections.  In  both  countries,  the  new 
governments faced tremendous problems inherited from their 
predecessors.  Although  in Romania,  they  lost  the  2000 
elections,  the country irreversibly stepped on the way 
toward liberal democracy and the western orientation, the 
most important positive result is the strengthening of 
civil society. The failure of the democratic forces in 2000 
had several  reasons  (mainly the  slowest  East  European 
economic reform), the new lesson provided by the Romanian 
■case,  which  is  the  importance  of  the  parliamentary, 
governmental  and bureaucratic  effectiveness  is  worth  a 
close look. 
The way Romanian democracy has developed, led to the 
establishment of numerous political parties52. The party 
system enabled many small parties, sometimes holding only 
51
 The Democratic Convention is a coalition between several parties (Social 
democrats, the Peasants Party and the National Liberal Party...) . 
52
 There are several reasons, why establishing parties is worthwhile. The 
Romanian case gives one example, which is the easy way to reach parliamentary 
representation, but others, like financial advances (campaign moneys) also have 
this result. 
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one seat in the Parliament. Many of these parties represent 
regional or ethnic groups and disperse the vote among the 
electorate,  so very few parties are able to hold power 
individually. The result was a coalition government with no 
single political party having overall power.  Instead an 
amalgamation of parties with different policies and view 
points united in order to rule the country. In an ideal 
world this might be regarded as a positive thing - a ruling 
government representing the wide and varied opinions of the 
people.  However,  this  system  also  has  its  pitfalls: 
disagreements53 and lack of compromise can delay or prevent 
essential  legislation  being  passed.  As  a  result,  the 
workings of government are delayed54. And most importantly, 
(although it did not happened in the Romanian case) the 
power of the President can significantly increase, of which 
consequences should be serious. 
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 The disagreements within the government peaked in a political chaos in 
November 1999, when the President dismissed the Prime Minister, but the 
Constitutional Court judged it unconstitutional, therefore he remained. But 
during this time, his Ministers resigned, and gathered under the leadership of 
another, temporary Prime Minister. Meanwhile in the backstage, the parties were 
looking for the right Prime and to satisfy the ex-Prime Minister, he was 
appointed to lead the Senate. Then the former government with its new Prime 
stayed in power. 
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 In the Romanian politics, disagreements within the ruling coalition have 
resulted in the dismissal of Premiers (Ciorbea, Vasile) and dozens of 
Ministers. The dismissals not only show a lack of confidence amongst the 
individual coalition members but also the level of instability within the 
government itself, and this in turn returns a negative response to the 
electorate. The parliamentary and governmental effectiveness had positive 
results in the successful transitions (see page 24-25.), the opposite of this 
is clearly apparent in the failure cases. 
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The third Romanian elections in 2000 were much more 
interesting55.  The minimum limit  to gain seats  in the 
parliament rose from 3 to 5 percent for parties and 10 
percent  for  coalitions  therefore  the  above  mentioned 
problem  does  not  endanger  the  Romanian  consolidation 
process anymore. What is more threatening today is that the 
Democratic  Convention  (which was  a  coalition)  got  5.3 
percent and not only lost the elections, but disappeared 
from  the  parliamentary  politics,  while  the  extremely 
nationalist and xenophobic Greater Romania Party  (PRM), 
collected 20 percent of the electoral votes55. From 1995, 
Iliescu and his Party of Social Democracy did not intend to 
cooperate with the PRM,  therefore the coalition had to 
include the ethnic Hungarians. This was possible because of 
Iliescu's and the PDSR's policy change toward accepting 
democratic rules: the west made huge pressures to make them 
understand, that their position in their next governance 
will be short-lived without foreign aid. With this foreign 
policy,  the west made its greatest contribution in the 
Romanian democratization. 
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 The outcome of the elections (only the Parliamentary parties) : PDSR 
(IliesciTs Party) - 37.5 percent, Greater Romania Party (PRM) - 20 percent, 
Democratic Party - 7.6 percent, National Liberal Party - 7 percent, Hungarian 
Democratic Alliance - 6.3 percent. 
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 Vadim Tudor, the leader of the PRM promised in his campaign to liquidate 
the mafia, to forbid the Hungarian Democratic Alliance, to stop privatization, 
to re-negotiate the IMF treaties, to reestablish the old boundaries (to annex 
Moldova, the Bulgarian Dobruja and the Ukrainian Bucovina). 
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In 2002, there could be a similar development in 
Slovakia, which seems to be in a permanent 2-year lag from 
the Romanian process. Today, the democratic government in 
Slovakia faces the same problems as the 1996-2000 Romanian 
democrats did, and they also seem to be unable to solve the 
economic problems. Meciar's return is highly possible, 
although there are several judicial cases (ordering the 
kidnapping of President Kovac's son, privatizing firms for 
close relatives and friends...) against him, and the 
democratization of the HZDS (like Iliescu's and his party) 
might also prevent him from regaining power. 
The legitimacy of governments depends on the system's 
efficiency in satisfying the peoples need. It does not 
matter whether these governments are democratically elected 
or not (although it is harder for democratically elected 
governments than others to provide these needs). This 
legitimization is very complex, but - in East and Central 
Europe specially - is in no way a result of rational 
decisions by those who are subject to the leaders and 
submit to domination. A very important fact leading to a 
nomination for leadership is the faith of those who believe 
that their leaders have the necessary extraordinary 
qualities.  Communism  failed  because  of  the  crises  of 
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legitimization, resulting from long-lasting negative 
outputs of the system, and rule by unpopular rulers. State 
structures of the communist regimes seemed so oppressive 
and strong that their failures were surprising. The 
positions held by the rulers of facade democracies are even 
weaker since their political and civil societies more or 
less limit their power, criticize their acts, and doubt 
their qualifications. The civil society and negative 
economic and political outputs make their rule highly 
vulnerable57. 
This fact is usually forgotten when the Western 
democracies form their policies about facade ones. However, 
the internal factor of unpopularity might be successfully 
fostered by external pressure. The European Communities 
(EC) acted to suspend PHARE58 assistance to Romania in June 
1990 after the use of force by the Romanian government in 
putting down peaceful demonstrations. Simultaneously, the 
twelve members of the EC adopted a declaration expressing 
deep  concern  over  the   suppression  of  demonstrations   and  the 
Former Yugoslav President Milosevic's fagade democracy also became 
vulnerable with the decreasing acceptance of his regime by the population. It 
made the whole system, including the security forces, weak, and when its only 
stronghold, the nationalistic character, was effectively neutralized by the 
"reform nationalist"  Kustunica,   nothing could stop the failure of his  regime. 
58 Poland Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy, initiated 
in 1989. Since then, with increasing budget, other reform countries joined the 
program. 
41 
European  Parliament   Committee   on  External   Economic 
Relations took a strong stand in favor of incorporating a 
human rights  clause  agreement  into any agreement with 
Romania59. The suspension of assistance in combination with 
political declarations can be regarded as a positive action 
in terms of democratization, although EC actions seem to 
have evolved in an ad hoc way as a result of the personal 
initiative  of  one  Commissioner.  The EU relations with 
Slovakia were similar. All the institutions, as well as the 
Troika on behalf of the member States, have made repeated 
references  to  the  respect  for  democratic  principles 
embedded in the Slovak Association Agreement. The Troika 
sent demarches to the Meciar government, expressing concern 
about institutional tensions and human right violations. 
Significantly, the EU' s declaration referred to Slovakia's 
Association status and close relationship with the EU, 
which made actions endangering the Slovak constitution also 
a threat to the "EU's common democratic practices"60. Other 
organizations such as NATO, OSCE, IMF, and the EBRD also 
59
 Agence Europe, No. 5278, 20 June 1990. 
60
 The EU made the link between accession criteria and the observance of 
democratic principles explicit by stating that "the EU attaches great 
importance to mutual tolerance and respect between the different sources of 
authority in a democratic society. Slovakia is an associated country in a pre- 
accession period and the criteria approved in the Copenhagen summit are 
applicable to it."{Agence Europe, No. 6593, 27 October 1995). Therefore, the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU could effectively foster 
democratization processes. 
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have proven to be effective promoters of democracy, (see 
Chapters III and IV) An interesting exception is the 
Council of Europe, which is usually referred to as the 
"Sacrifice of the West"61, although its Recommendation 1210 
was included in many states' Basic Contracts, therefore 
contributing to the normalization of  inter-state relations. 
Negative processes, as the Romanian and Slovakian 
cases prove, are not necessarily irreversible. However, to 
realize the necessity for the change does not always 
originate from peaceful tendencies. The process of 
democratization, as Huntington observed, may stimulate 
ethnic conflict (xenophobia and anti-minority, as the 
Romanian and Slovakian case show, remains a permanent issue 
in East and Central Europe) and induce weak states to meet 
communal rebellion        with repression rather than 
accommodation: 
the     resolution     of     ethnopolitical     conflicts     in 
institutionalized democracies depends most 
fundamentally on the implementation of 
universalistic       norms       of       equal       rights       and 
opportunities    for    all    citizens    and    pluralistic 
It is obvious, and western politicians confirm, that the Council of 
Europe, which is the main promoter of the human and ethnic rights has members 
with dubious or strongly destructive policies in these fields. The Council of 
Europe enlarged fast after 1989-1990, temporarily satisfying the western 
orientation of  the post-communist  reform countries. 
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accommodation  of  group  desires  for  separate 
collective status.62 
What if these institutions and adequate procedures of 
validating different interests are missing? 
The former Soviet state, Moldova (called Moldavia 
during Soviet rule) provides a perfect case study to answer 
this question. It is also proves the democratic peace 
theory, and Mansfield's and Snyder's argument63, that in the 
transitional phase of democratization, countries become 
more unstable and threatening. In 1989/90, Moldova was an 
exclusive, rather than inclusive democracy, which, 
especially in multi-ethnic communities, is usually a casus 
belli, not just for Civil, but inter-state war. In 
Hungtinghton's view, 
...the initiation of elections forces political 
leaders to compete for votes. In many situations, 
the easiest way to win votes is to appeal to 
tribal, ethnic, and religious constituencies. 
Democratization thus promotes communalism and 
ethnic conflict64. 
This was exactly the case in Moldova. The successful 
solution of the Moldovan conflict is a useful experience, 
62
 Ted Robert Gurr: "Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical 
Conflicts", p.137, U.S. Institute of Peace, 1993. 
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especially     today,      when     ethnic      tensions      are     high     in 
Macedonia  and Albania. 
As Glasnost permitted a national awakening throughout 
the USSR, the Moldovans began to reclaim their Romanian 
heritage (see Bessarabia). There were protests organized by 
the Popular Front65, which quickly united the opposition66 
around the restoration of Romanian as the national language 
and the identity of Moldovans as well as demands for union 
with Romania. In 1988, under pressure from Moldovan and 
Romanian nationalists, the Moldovan Supreme Soviet which 
was still under Russian control, agreed to return the 
"Moldovan" language to the Latin alphabet, and in January 
1989 the Supreme Soviet made Romanian the only official 
state language in the Moldovan SSR67. Then came the question 
of the state flag, which also had a Romanian orientation. 
The   majority   preferred   the   Romanian   traditional   tri-colors 
65
 In Moldova, pressure for change to the socio-political system, and 
demands for national revival, had been initiated before the actual collapse of 
the Soviet Union. The first public meetings were held in 1988, at which members 
of the intelligentsia, students, and those who had suffered under Stalin, began 
to openly discuss questions of culture and education. As the debate 
intensified, unauthorized public meetings and demonstrations occurred, 
involving thousands of people. As the demonstrations increased so did the 
demands.   Http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uul2ee/uul2ee0a.htm 
Such    groups    and    their    elite    claimed    exclusive    power    over    cultural 
institutions  and priority status within the  economy and social  services. 
67
 The decision reserved the rights of non-Moldovans to speak and write in 
their own languages (Russian was to be used for "inter-ethnic communication"), 
but all local and national authorities had to be able to operate in Romanian 
too. The law also designated the removal of officials who have not met the 
required proficiency. 
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of red, yellow and blue. At the same time, street names in 
Chisinau and other mostly Moldovan cities, were reverted to 
the names they were called in the Romanian era. 
These events caused great anxiety among older- 
established minority groups - such as the Gagauz, a 
150,000-strong Turkic people who inhabited a region in the 
south of Moldova, and the 'new' minorities, such as those 
Russians and Ukrainians who had migrated to Moldova in 
Soviet times. Many resided east of the River Dniester in 
the region known now as 'Transdniestria' . They sought to 
challenge their suddenly diminished status and the 
discriminatory attitudes being displayed towards them. When 
a parliamentary election produced a majority of deputies 
reflecting the new nationalistic mood, a bitter 
confrontation within the Parliament ensued, which was made 
worse by a lack of experience in parliamentary procedures. 
The new minority groupings, especially those representing 
Slavic interests, now found themselves with a limited and 
ineffectual political 'voice' and decided to withdraw from 
Parliament. 
The two extreme positions had thus been brought 
sharply into focus. These tensions had initially been 
voiced and acted upon by political and cultural groupings 
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of either a nationalist or anti-nationalist persuasion, 
while people at the grassroots level had not been as 
aggressive in their demands. However, they too were to 
prove easily manipulated by the protagonists on both sides 
of the argument68. A vital role was played in this 
manipulation by the mass media, raising serious questions 
about the professionalism and responsibility of journalists 
in conflict situations. Largely thanks to them, the society 
in Moldova became increasingly polarized. 
As a result, violent conflicts broke out among the 
Moldovan government and the two largest minority groups, 
which had spillovers: the Transdniesterian Slavs were 
effectively backed up by the 14th Russian Army, stationed on 
the territory of the new independent Moldova, while the 
Romanian-friendly government acquired weapons and other 
resources from Romania. 
The Gagauz question was quickly settled, providing the 
minority an exceptional autonomy69 in Europe, while the 
Transdnesterian conflict  is still unsolved.  Furthermore, 
68
 Huntington's argument that "potential threat to new democracies comes 
from the electoral victory of parties or movements apparently committed to 
antidemocratic ideologies" is clearly relevant in this case. 
(http://muse.jhu.edU/journals/journal_of_democracy/v007/7.2huntington.html.) 
69
 The Gagauz autonomy is sharply criticized by the EU, interestingly enough 
not for being restrictive, but for being too permissive and generous. The 
Moldovan government decided to fulfill all the Gagauz demands as the 
Transdniesterian conflict escalated. 
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the permanent instability of the area creates more problems 
and not just in the neighboring territories: Transdniestria 
became the main transit station for drug and human 
trafficking, a hiding place for the mafias, and terrorists. 
The Moldovan conflict highlights the importance of 
loyalty, independence (militarily and economically) and the 
human and minority rights, which is not a domestic affair 
anymore - definitely not in the region. Concerning loyalty, 
because of the multi-paced democratization, an interesting 
tendency,  the  change  in  loyalty  perceptions  can  be 
observed. While in Moldova,  the ethnic Russians remained 
loyal to Moscow, events unfolded in a different way in the 
Baltic  states:   as  democratization  and  consolidation 
processes diverged,  and the Baltic states made positive 
results   both   politically   and   economically,   their 
significant Russian minorities (over 3 0 percent) started to 
feel much better in their new-old homes,  claimed their 
Baltic  origin  and  started  to  assimilate  without  any 
external  pressures  but  by themselves.  This  is  clearly 
proved by the disappearance of the ethnic-based parties. 
The reasons are not only economic (promising future for the 
youth - so called "Eurorussians", provided pensions for the 
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elderly)  but also political  (vivid civil organizations, 
equal participation...) . 
The importance of military and economic independence 
is obvious. While most of the Central and Eastern European 
countries established new orientations (even the CIS 
countries' partners are mainly western countries) some 
strategically important (mostly raw material) areas 
remained Russian dependent. The disadvantages (and 
advantages in some Caucasian CIS members) of the military 
dependence in Central and Eastern Europe -excluding 
Moldova- have ceased to exist. Only the unsolved issue of 
the supply of military equipment and spare-parts remains in 
concern. 
Analysts of the region specify the emerging 
nationalism as one of the most peace-threatening factors. 
One of the disaster scenarios in Eastern Europe (with 
decreasing relevance today) was the "white after red", 
which refers to the ultra nationalist turn, following 
communism. What is the solution then to the "ideological 
war" ? 
In the  last  decade,  to  find the  answer  it  took 
continuous  efforts,  billions  of dollars.  Interestingly, 
history gave the answer: in Eastern and Central Europe, the 
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most effective democratizers are the center-right-wing 
forces. This confusion concerning the role of nationalism 
comes from a misunderstanding. East and Central European 
transitions prove that it is not nationalism, but 
xenophobia what is influencing and hindering the 
transition, but mainly the consolidation period. The 
Greater Romania Party, the Hungarian Life and Truth Party, 
and other extreme right wing forces in Europe are 
xenophobic rather than nationalist in nature. 
Today, in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the 
Baltic states and some other countries (see footnote 57 
about Yugoslavia) after a few elections, nationalist forces 
have strengthened and successfully lead their countries (or 
assist in doing so) . They are capable of neutralizing the 
extreme nationalist (or xenophobic) right, while providing 
effective governance, stability and Western acceptance. 
They ideologically unite their nations, while capable of 
providing rights for other minorities70 on their 
territories. They are also a reasonable alternative against 
the communist left wings, preventing the "return of red" 
scenario, which -after the political and economic failures 
70
 In Romania, 11 years after the fall of communism, in May 2001 the 
governing center-right forces created and the Parliament adopted the basic 
rights (Municipal Law - the right to use their ethnic language in 
administrative procedures and erect bi-lingual place-name signs) for the 
minorities (mainly consisted of Hungarians, Germans, Ukrainians). 
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of the governments- swept through East and Central Europe. 
The former communists came back into power as the first 
democratic governments lost the second elections almost 
everywhere.  Although  it  did  not  mean  a  communist 
restoration, many of them are democrats, and lead their 
countries toward the EU or into the NATO.  Croatia's Franjo 
Tudjman,   Hungary's  Gyula  Horn,   Lithuania's  Algirdas 
Brazauskas,  Macedonia's  Kiro  Gligorov,  Moldova's  Petru 
Lucinschi, Romania's Ion Iliescu,  Slovakia's Meciar, and 
Serbia's Milosevic are not cast in the same mold, though 
all are former communist officials. To describe them as 
"cynical pragmatists,  chameleon-like survivors,  ready to 
espouse any creed with lightening speed... if it only upholds 
their stay in power, " as Vladimir Tismaneanu does in his 
book71 is to generalize from Iliescu to Gyula Horn, from 
Milosevic to Aleksander Kwasniewski. Timothy Garton Ash saw 
some of their return as not dangerous: "Kwasniewski and his 
friends want desperately to be seen not as eastern post- 
communists but as regular western social democrats."72 
Therefore it is the proof of stability in the region 
and the irreversibility of democracy in a country, if there 
71
 Tismaneanu: "Revolutions of 1989", 1999, (p. 52). 
72
 Timothy Garton Ash:  "Neo-Pagan'  Poland",  New York Review of Books 
(January 11, 1996) . 
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are only two influencing blocks remaining in a county's 
political arena: the central right (civic parties) and the 
central-left (social democrats). 
East European leaders and actors in the political life 
must change in the same directions (ceter-right or center- 
left) and it requires an effective foreign policy from the 
west. To give maximum support to them it is not enough to 
fight the surviving or emerging anti-democratic ideologies 
but economic, social and cultural roots of the reforms must 
be addressed as well. 
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III. ECONOMIC   STABILITY 
A. ECONOMIC   INEFFICIENCY AND   ITS   CONSEQUENCES 
In    the    beginning    of     the     transitions     in    East     and 
Central Europe, many scholars argued that economic 
development was not a key factor in the process of 
democratization. They viewed it as a significant component 
and a contributor to the political consolidation and a 
resource to finance and manage institutions, but no more. 
The proposition that economic growth and distribution do 
not constitute the only dimension by which regime 
performance is assessed was obvious, but handling it as a 
secondary component  of  consolidation was  a mistake73. 
Contrary to these views, Central and Eastern European 
experiences have proven how important economic stability 
and development is, and failing to recognize its crucial 
role, has serious consequences in jeopardizing the success 
of the democratic transition and regional stability 
everywhere. From security point of view, economic 
development tends to generate more democratic values and 
norms   involving   proper   ethnic   policy,   minimize   feelings   of 
73
 It was widely accepted, that political democracy would force a market 
economy to develop and only minor corrections would be necessary. However, 
capitalism requires much more than that. It functions because of the widespread 
acceptance and enforcement in an economy of fundamental rules and safeguards 
that make  the outcomes of  exchange  secure,   predictable,   and widely beneficial. 
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nostalgia for the previous or other authoritarian regime, 
prevent communists and nationalist from gaining power, and 
has many other effects that will be seen later which have 
proven to be fundamental stabilizing factors in the region. 
To secure democratic consolidation, the regime's 
performance must be seriously addressed. Over time, 
democratic regimes must produce positive results to build 
broad political legitimacy74. Of course, it is not easy to 
implement the proper measures. One of the most significant 
problems to build more effective democracies is that each 
country in East and Central Europe (and even the most 
successful ones) have huge loads of structural distortions 
and vulnerabilities, such as high public deficits, decaying 
public infrastructure, low investment, a fiscally unviable 
social security system, and the massive frustrations left 
over from a long decade of stagnation, during which per 
capita income declined. The fiscal limitations of these 
governments prevent structural reforms, which would create 
a much more manageable  and cheaper system75.  Democracy 
74 »prom any political system but perhaps especially from democracy, people 
expect more than economic growth and security." (Diamond: Developing Democracy 
Toward Consolidation). 
75
 These missing structural adjustments multiplied the problems in the later 
decades. For instance, unreformed and state financed health care systems have 
very bad cost/productivity ratios, and the absence of information systems in 
the police forces resulted in parallel investigations of the same case in 
different cities which resulted in the delay (high costs) of their structural 
reforms. 
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cannot be consolidated until these remaining structural 
distortions are addressed. 
In the last couple of years, transition economists 
recognized what comparative politics scholars have failed 
to see, and became interested in the destabilizing effects 
of the economic shock therapies76. They realized that 
earlier economists were unable to offer viable economic 
alternatives to the new democracies and their advice to 
reduce expenditures, and increase the taxation of the 
population have already caused irreversible consequences. 
Many of them became interested not in the East and Central 
European transition, but as economists named: "the length 
of the slope." 
During the years of this economic reform, the tasks of 
the governments became clear: 
transforming ownership relationships 
establishing  the  institutions  and  the  legal 
background of the market economy 
internal and external market liberalization 
reforming the state budget 
transforming the structure of the economy 
The aim of the stabilization was to keep the basic 
macro-dependents   (GDP,   unemployment  rate,   inflation, 
To bring off this economic transition, East and Central European 
countries begun their so called "shock therapy", which, sooner or later, 
resulted more in shocks than in therapies. 
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budget,    state   debt,    foreign   trade-balance   of   payment)    from 
reaching   a    critical   point,    and    let    them   create    a    secure 
economic   growth  with  perspectives77.   Since   no   precedent   for 
a   transition   from  a  planned   to   market   economy  existed,   the 
chaotic    situation    worsened    by    the    lack    of    an    economic 
strategy.    Since    neither    detailed    reforms,    nor   priorities 
were     developed,      this     caused     serious     problems     in     the 
forthcoming     years.      Although      these      plans,      mainly     the 
adaptations       of       the       "advice"       of       foreign       financial 
institutions   providing   loans,   were   created   sooner   or   later, 
they     remained     inconsistent     economic     strategies     as     the 
governments   changed78.   Nobody,    even   the   best   economists   and 
foreign    financial     institutions     could    foresee    what    price 
these   new   democracies   would   have   to   pay   for   these   systemic 
changes.   This   was,   and   still   is   a  very  serious   situation   in 
many   countries   because   mismanaging   the   situation   endangers 
all  democratization processes. 
When   the   reforms   first   began,    it   seemed   easy   to   solve 
the   problems   during   this   euphoric   time   since   expectations 
77
 Implementing these tasks made the implementation of other tasks harder: 
GDP growth generates inflation, while the other aim is to decrease the 
inflation rate, changing the ownership and transforming the structure of the 
economy results in the decrease of production, and it was also obvious that 
liberalization and state-budget  reform also creates higher inflation. 
7
° In most of the successful economic transitions' cases, the governments 
remained in power for long periods of time to provide consistent reforms. In 
the case of Hungary, each government was in power for four years, while in 
other countries, the frequent government changes/failures played a significant 
role  in  the current  difficulties. 
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ran high and promises were made even though many were 
irrational and mistakes were not confronted. Consequently, 
disappointments were more keenly felt. The alienation of 
the political society from the civil society caused further 
problems, because the decision making process did not 
involve the participants of the economy and society, such 
as entrepreneurs, managers, employees, workers' 
associations, which could have resulted in better 
effectiveness and a strengthened democracy. Just as during 
the communist era, knowledge was replaced by loyalty to the 
elite. 
The missing radical economic policies of many of the 
governments and the delay in implementing the necessary 
harsh measures for economic transformation prolonged the 
economic transition and also the period of uncertainty and 
disappointment. The new governments have been working at 
very low efficiency. Of course, economic reforms in East 
and Central Europe would have reduced the living standards 
and worsened the economic indicators, but the lack of 
expertise, experience, and the missing radical or 
mismanaged  economic  policies  of  the  governments  and 
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financial  institutions  led  to  a  dead  end  in  some 
countries79. 
Mismanaged privatizations for instance prove that any 
kind of failures in economic reforms are significant 
destabilizing factors and greatly influence democratic 
stability. When it is well thought-out and cautious, 
privatization leads to significant increase in budget 
revenues, changes fundamental ownership relationships, 
increases competition, and therefore ensures further 
stabilization of the economy. Selling the property of the 
state at reasonable prices minimizes the economic role of 
the state, stimulates the producer to work for himself, and 
inspires him with competition, thus creating a new economic 
elite. 
By contrast, the lack of new, legal economic 
regulations, the success of the old (or a new, but not less 
undemocratic) elite in transforming their power and some 
other factors result in several negative outcomes in many 
of the East European countries. The economic role of the 
state remains immense and producers are motivated more to 
steal from the state than to produce. However, creating a 
weak state through false privatization is only one of the 
79
 About basic economic indicators in some of the countries in the region, 
see Appendix B. 
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several serious consequences. In many transition countries, 
mass and rapid privatization turned over mediocre assets to 
large  numbers  of  people,  mainly  close  friends,  party 
members, even relatives, who had neither the skills nor the 
financial resources to use them well. This means further 
difficulties for economic stabilization in the future. The 
failures are not only the consequences of the mistakes made 
by  new  governments.  Although  international  financial 
institutions  recognized  the  importance  of  competitive 
policies and institutional safeguards, they believed these 
could be  implemented later.  The  immediate need was to 
create a basic constituency of property owners. To build 
capitalism, a lot of capitalists were needed and fast. This 
mistake  should be  a very important  lesson for  future 
generations80. 
International financial institutions also bear other 
responsibilities for these poor outcomes of the economies. 
They  required   transition  governments   to   implement 
80
 Economists offer some advice on further privatization processes: 
postpone further privatization until competitive forces and an 
enabling institutional/governmental framework are in place 
calls for the re-nationalization of some or many divested firms, with 
the intention of undoing the damage and managing these assets more in 
the public interest, through greater state involvement or re- 
privatization at some later date. This way does not appear to be a 
highly likely option, although it has been proposed for Russia and 
Ukraine. The new rulers of these countries are not keeping only the 
economic power in their hands, but the political power as well, and 
there is no hope of creating laws for re-nationalization. Some 
mistakes and processes are not irreversible during reforms. 
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restriction measures, shock therapies, but deliminated 
themselves from the sacrifices these countries had to 
undertake81. Another problem is the lack of specialization. 
Even the communists were aware about the importance of 
specialization, to reach maximum benefits from the 
cooperation. The comparative advances of Hungary in 
electronics and chemicals, the Balkans and Germany in light 
industrial products, Poland and Moldova in agriculture- 
disappeared. The first governments had no resources to save 
these fields of their economies, and the financial 
institutions prioritized other areas of the reform when 
provide loans. 
The economic experiments of transition and 
consolidation periods, the role of economic effectiveness 
in the successful reforms and their different 
accomplishments will provide enough work for comparative 
politics analysts and economists for the next few decades. 
Issues like the relevance and possible effects of a new 
Marshall Plan in Eastern Europe (see Chapter V) or the 
problems of integration into the global world are key 
topics today. 
81
 For instance, the IMF requested Romania to reform its economy, which 
caused immediate impoverishment and threatened the democratization itself to 
provide about 300 million dollars loan. At the same time, Romania had to pay- 
its debts and their interests, amounting around 2 billion USD each year. The 
situation is similar in other countries too. (http://www.imf.org) 
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B.   SECURITY CONSEQUENCES OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 
The focus on economic, political and legal reforms are 
all important, but the security impact of the economic 
reforms, and the restricting measures particularly, is the 
most critical, least researched, and least understood 
aspect of the last decade. The overall security 
consequences of the economic failures are wide spread. 
Economic efficiency is closely related to the resources 
available in any crisis situation and highly influences the 
capabilities of each country to face these problems. 
One should say that economic inefficiency has direct 
and indirect security consequences. Direct consequences 
mean the possibility for an immediate turn-back, 
revolution, even civil war or inter-state conflict. For 
instance, after several increases in fuel prices in October 
1990, the Hungarian democracy suffered its first shock with 
the blockade of taxi drivers, supported by the entire 
population. Even the idea of using military forces arose. 
Only the President's responsiveness ensured that the crisis 
was solved peacefully. A successful anti-government 
movement happened in Romania in 1991, when the miners of 
the Jiu Valley, after months of unpaid work, decided to 
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march       into       Bucharest       and       overthrow       Petre       Roman's 
government. 
There    are    also    several    indirect    consequences    of    the 
long-term     negative     outputs.      For     example,      it     generates 
political   cynicism  by   decreasing   the   percentage   of   voters, 
less   active   labor  unions,   people  with  second  jobs   that  have 
no    time    for    civic    organizations    and    representation,    and 
threatens   the   viability   of   the   whole   civil   society.    Other 
indirect     consequences     of     the     economic     inefficiency    and 
reform    failures    may    further    destabilize    the    region.     For 
instance,     the    disappearance    of    a     social    net     encourages 
people   to   review   their   loyalties   and   find   other   guarantees 
to    provide    their    security    or    social    welfare,    be    it    from 
terrorists     or    the    Mafia     and    criminal     groups,     or    even 
another    state.     This     happened     in    the     case     of    Moldova. 
Another   example    is    the    tense   Hungarian-Romanian   relations 
because     of     the     continuous     poisoning     of     the     rivers     by 
Romanian        companies, which        cannot        afford        adequate 
environment      protection82.      Democratic      consolidation     also 
requires     the    gradual     social     and    political     inclusion    of 
82
 The title of my thesis "Security In The Central And East European Multi- 
Paced Democratization Process" refers to these kinds of problems caused by the 
different effectiveness of the democratization processes. As early as 1993, a 
UN study, titled "European Economic Analysis" declares the fact that the 
homogenous Eastern and Central Europe ceased to exist both in political and 
economic terms. 
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severely marginalized poorer classes and ethnic, regional 
minorities, who need economic resources. There are voices 
calling the migration of gypsies from Eastern and Central 
Europe to the West the "gypsy exodus." Thousands of them 
arrived in Canada, France, Belgium and England during the 
last years. The reason for their move is clearly economic, 
and overshadows East-West relations. 
Besides democratic development, economic stability is 
another key to regional security and stability. Without it, 
the social security net weakens, old infectious illnesses 
reappear83, average life span drops, education levels fall, 
criminal activities rise84. The social cohesion and strength 
of the nation disappears, families disintegrate, people 
become envious, arrogant, alcoholics, suicidal. The loss of 
food security results in famine85, environmental security 
degrades,   flooding  cause  property  loss,   the  budget 
83
 In October 1994, there were hundreds of patients infected by cholera in 
Ukraine, threatening the surrounding countries, therefore the borders had to be 
closed. The Ukrainian government was in a tough situation, and hoped the cold 
winter would prevent the spread of the disease. (HVG CD collection, Keyword: 
"kolera, Ukrajna") 
84
 In Poland, the official crime rate is 40% higher than in 1990; in Romania 
it's nearly five times higher. The reasons are clear, though they are so basic 
that hard to solve. For example, there is more private property to steal, and 
there are fewer informers and less fear of the authorities. (HVG CD collection, 
Keyword: "Kozep Kelet Europa, bunesetek") 
85
 The economic decline in Albania resulted in a dangerous situation in 
1992, when only international food donations could prevent the outbreak of 
famine. 
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limitations  endanger  environment  protection,  and  the 
country's efforts vanish in a catch-22 vertigo. 
Another significant consequence of the fall of 
communism is the change in security perceptions. From the 
main security area of the military, the emphasis transposed 
to those areas, mentioned above. Increasing 
internationalization has led to new types the strengthening 
sensitivity of the states and their populations toward 
environmental pollutions, new crimes like money laundering, 
drug and humans trafficking or terrorism86. 
Despite the substantial political and economic reforms 
undertaken since the fall of communism in many of the 
countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern and 
Central Europe, they have largely failed to provide an 
adequate social safety net for their citizens. Until the 
abrupt end of socialism in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
Socialist countries were grand experiments in state- 
sponsored welfare systems that claimed to provide free, 
accessible health care, free housing, education, guaranteed 
employment, state retirement pensions, and free universal 
child care facilities.  The social contract between the 
86
 For instance, in November 1994, German intelligence authorities warned 
Lithuania, that after the conviction of a Lithuanian criminal, his fellow 
conspirators were planning to take revenge by blowing up a 1500 megawatts 
nuclear reactor. The power loss from suspending its operation had serious 
consequences. 
64 
State and the workers during the Soviet era ensured cradle 
to grave security for all citizens in exchange for their 
individual freedoms. This "bargain" between the state and 
its citizens also created a widespread mentality that 
survived the fall of communism. Citizens during the 
transition periods still expect the state to provide the 
basic necessities of life. 
The most immediate impact of the economic difficulties 
was the rapid impoverishment of the majority of the 
population (see average wages in Appendix B) . More than 75 
million people fell into poverty from 1989 through the mid 
1990's, and wages dipped for most people to less than 50 
percent of their previous earnings. The Russian financial 
crisis of 1998 led to an estimated additional 20 million 
people sinking into poverty. 
One of the consequences of this crisis is a sense of 
malaise and hopelessness, which has resulted in higher 
suicide rates and a lowering of the already low birthrates. 
Fewer healthy men and women are available to join the 
workforce, armies, or leadership positions. This is the 
first time in the history of the modern world that highly 
industrialized nations face a reduction in life expectancy. 
Health  statistics  indicate  that  numerous  nations  in 
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transition are unable to cope with the rising rates of 
tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and other infectious diseases. The 
most vulnerable groups in society, the elderly and 
children, have paid the highest price, and for the 
children, the future looks grim. Today's children will be 
the future leaders, professionals, and workers who must 
carry these countries into the next century, yet they are 
the sickest, most neglected, and most destitute sector of 
the population. Communism failed because it lost the youth, 
and now young people feel despair regarding the future 
again. 
The problems with the economies, which created social 
tensions, despair, inequality, enviousness, distrust, hate, 
and racism have more far reaching consequences. The 
perception of the disappointed population is that 
globalization = capitalism = democracy = poverty, and this 
misunderstanding is a big threat: it contributes to the 
popularity of the undemocratic forces. 
Socialism resulted in social cohesion within the 
population, which quickly evaporated. This is a social 
threat facing the Eastern and Central European countries, 
and it threatens from within. Without a clear understanding 
of the causes, it is difficult to implement solutions to 
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address the problem. The overwhelming question that these 
nations will face in the next decade is what kind of short 
term measures can be implemented that will eventually bring 
long term gains, but will also alleviate human suffering? 
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IV. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL STATE, GROUP AND 
INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS. EASTERN VS. CENTRAL EUROPE. 
With the fall of communism and the elimination of the 
superior Soviet Union, the homogenous East and Central 
Europe ceased to exist. The countries regained their 
autonomy, the right to shape their own future, including 
the responsibility to harmonize their interests with the 
norms of the international community. 
This region of Europe, where state interests are 
diffuse, including political and economic survival, 
minority issues, the establishment and stabilization of new 
states created by the disintegration and so many other 
interests such as the individual interests of the leaders 
and foreign companies, is full of tensions, which led or 
would lead to many probable conflicts. Some issues of this 
broad spectrum have already been solved, some are 
consolidated, but still create tensions, and of course, the 
multi-paced democratization will be responsible for many 
more in the future. 
It is hard to establish a new framework, where these 
interests and possible conflicts might be categorized and 
sorted out. Only a piece of this work was accomplished by 
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the RAND Corporation in a study, titled "Anticipating 
Ethnic Conflict"87; this research provides a methodology to 
follow only the cultural-ethnic field. To study other areas 
and developments, which might destabilize the region, 
analysts need very detailed databases of the political, 
economic and ethnic-cultural history and contemporary 
tendencies  of  the  region. 
Realists may find many developments of the East and 
Central European consolidation an ultimate proof of the 
main idea of their theory, namely that international 
relations are defined by the conflicting interests of 
states, and not by international norms or regulations. 
Facade democracies of course, are perfect proofs of this 
theory;   the Russian foreign policy is worth a  look. 
The Cold War is over and the Soviet Union is history, 
but certain events have shed a disturbing light on the 
tactics and possible goals that the Kremlin may be 
pursuing. Russia officially is against NATO enlargement, 
and makes serious efforts to undermine its westward- 
oriented   neighbors   and   not   only   in   diplomacy.    Recently   it 
87
 This research of the RAND's Arroyo Center was financed by the U.S. Army. 
The study is "a practical tool - a guidebook and a methodology to follow - for 
intelligence analysts to use in determining the long-term potential for 
communitarian and ethnic conflict." (p. ix., published by RAND, 1997), a 
complimentary list of preconditions of these conflicts, which elements are 
stabilizing or instabilizing in nature, driving this conflict toward violence 
or peace.   This  study is highly usable  in the analysis of  the Moldovan case. 
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has come to the attention of the relevant Polish 
authorities that the Russian pipeline traversing their 
country is accompanied by a fiber-optic trunk placed 
alongside by the Russian contractors with far greater 
communication performance than required to merely operate 
the pipeline. The excess capacity was clearly intended to 
provide a permanent intelligence carrier straight across 
the heart of a new NATO ally88. Another recent scandal is 
still unfolding with reference to one of the Hungary's most 
strategically important chemical facilities. Russia's state 
energy giant Gazprom previously tried to buy significant 
Hungarian chemical industrial giants but unsuccessfully. 
Their second try used legally dubious tactics and the 
hidden nature of the take-over through an Irish firm89, has 
led to the Hungarian government becoming involved and 
investigations of money-laundering allegations have been 
initiated. 
Rarely has an article provoked the new NATO and EU 
candidates' and Brussels's interest on the scale as 
happened in march 2001, when the Jane's International 
Defence published a column about the events surrounding the 
88 Http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jid/jid010309_l_n.shtml 
89
 Although western governments help the Central and East European countries 
to fight illegal economic actions, this example proves, that forcing foreign 
companies to behave properly during their business and investigate their 
investments needs to be taken seriously. 
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Russian operatives with the Zämoly Roma of Hungary who had 
appeared in the Hague and Brussels to protest persecution 
and violation of human rights before EU bodies. They even 
requested political asylum so as to make Hungary look much 
worse  than  it  is  during  the  crucial  EU  accession 
negotiations which are currently taking place.  What is 
interesting is that the political patron of the Zämoly 
group in Paris and Strasbourg was the French Communist 
Party, which is known to have had strong associations with 
the KGB in the past.  The Zämoly group appeared to be 
financed by sources from Israel,  which with the recent 
influx of Russian emigres is highly penetrated by foreign 
intelligence90. Perhaps the most damaging methods employed 
by Moscow are not new, they were tried in the aspirant 
Czech  Republic  first  and  subsequently  transplanted  to 
90 "Russian intelligence penetration occurring in central Europe." Jane's 
International Defence, 23 February 2001. online: 
http://www.janes.com/security/regional_security/news/jid/jid010226_l_n.shtml 
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Hungary91, proving the fact that the Kremlin has always used 
the minorities in reaching its aims92. 
It  is  well  known  by  now  that  under  Meciar's 
leadership, the Slovak Republic became a seething hot-bed 
of Russian interests, as it seemed that with NATO's first 
post-1990 expansion, Slovakia would make an ideal and less 
than democratic outpost of Russian interests in the heart 
of   a   rapidly   stabilizing   and   westerly   committed 
neighborhood. The most obvious proofs of these Slovakian 
Intelligence Service  (SIS)  actions revealed after Meciar 
has been fortunately dethroned  in 199893.  Subsequently, 
tactics are being refined. The so-called "Omega action", 
planned by the SIS was to make the countries of the region 
believe,  that the USA favors Hungary,  providing special 
attention toward her. "Operation Dezo" was planned to lash 
up racism, anti-gypsy feelings in the Czech Republic to 
slow  down  the  EU  integration  process,  while  "Neutron 
91 Hungarian Minister without Portfolio for the Security Services, Ervin 
Demeter confirmed that "external forces" were at play behind the mass exodus of 
Roma from the Czech Republic in 1992-93, particularly after the installation of 
the pro-European government. 
Although Moscow's minority policy proved to be stabilizing in many cases. 
Shortly after Yeltsin's declaration, that Russia decreases the oil export to 
Latvia to force the government to settle the status of the Russian minority. 
Russians in Latvia (30 percent of the population) had no citizenship, no right 
to elect and to be elected. Instead of economic, Moscow used military pressure 
against Estonia for similar reasons in April 1994: The Kremlin declared, that 
instead of military withdrawal, they increase their presence, if the security 
and rights of the Russian minority would not be guaranteed. 
93
 The Russian influence is still there, however, but is having to come to 
terms with a changed political environment. 
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action" promoted the perception of dangers of NATO 
membership within the Czech population. "Operation Vychod 
(East)" targeted the Slovak population: SIS tried to 
convince the people, that the only alternative for Slovakia 
is the Russian orientation. It is not proven that SIS is 
involved in some of the terror outrages in the surrounding 
countries, but the terrorists used Slovak explosives 
xdanubit' and had Slovakian diplomat passports. 
Of course, it is understandable that a newly created 
country, like Slovakia, tries to maximize its security and 
strengthen  its  state  structures,   but  it  does  not 
necessarily  have   to   induce   the   security  paradigm 
(escalating inter-state conflicts or arms race). It needs 
the misperception of the decision-makers to over-react some 
events, as happened in Estonia for instance. In 1992 Prime 
Minister Mart  Laar,  with  the  introduction of  the  new 
Estonian currency sold the old Russian Ruble  (2.3 billion) 
to Chechnya for 1.9 million USD, destabilizing not only the 
Caucasian region,  but  jeopardizing the Baltic security. 
Events like that understandably result in security policy 
revisions in Russia, which brings up the security paradigm: 
Russia is establishing forward outposts from which it can 
more  effectively operate against  conflicting  interests, 
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like the next enlargement of the European Union or NATO. 
Besides the hidden actions (see the pipeline or gypsy- 
cases) , there is a more obvious embodiment of this tactic: 
the movement of weapons (including nuclear, told by- 
intelligence services) from the mainland of the Russian 
Federation into the separated Kaliningrad oblast and the 
presence of the 14th Russian Army on the territory of 
Moldova. 
However, economic interests are also destabilizing the 
region.  Although with the  re-establishment  of  economic 
relations  (end  of  Council  of  Mutual  Economic  Aid, 
establishment  of  CEFTA  and  other  initiations)   the 
cooperation  between  the  countries  of  the  region  is 
improving,   extreme   forces   (nationalists,   xenophobes, 
communists)  still  view  and  interpret  incoming  foreign 
direct investments as a threat against the sovereignty of 
their  states  to  their  electorates.  As  democratization 
processes,   and  these  political   forces   lose   their 
electorates, they turn to be more radical94. Besides the 
political,  the  development  of  economic  relations  also 
proves another idea of the realist theory: states cooperate 
94
 One of the latest rumors of the extreme forces in Eastern Europe is that 
Central European countries use all means available to prevent their 
democratization, because the western capital, invested so far in Central Europe 
would leave their countries to go further Eastward, which would result in 
unemployment and economic stagnation. 
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only when it is advantageous for them. The Czech Republic 
opposed the initiation of CEFTA, and have not joined the 
organization for years, because -as the fastest developing 
economy in the early and mid 90s- it was not in its 
interest. 
Regarding ethnic and cultural relations, 
democratization has very positive results in mutual 
understanding in a multi-ethnic region. The role of western 
institutions is decisive because transition countries -as a 
direct consequence of their not fully democratic decision- 
making process- are missing consciousness in their actions 
in many cases. The very sensitive area of ethnic relations 
is one of them. To prove this statement, it is worth to 
take a look at the latest happening in Central Europe 
(including Hungary, Ukraine, Romania, Yugoslavia, Croatia, 
Slovenia, Austria, Slovakia), the Hungarian Status Law. 
The so-called Status Law, recently approved by the 
Hungarian Parliament has far reaching security 
implications. After World War I, 2/3rd of the territory of 
Hungary was detached, and millions of Hungarians became 
minorities in the surrounding countries. Today, as the 
economy develops, and the revenues make it possible, the 
Hungarian government (together with the opposition) decided 
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to provide "Hungarian identification cards" and offer jobs, 
free health care and education for the ethnic Hungarians 
living outside of Hungary. From security point of view, 
this  act  has  many  negative  results,  not  only  by 
strengthening  nationalist  feelings  in  the  surrounding 
countries,  but with fostering the Hungarian minorities' 
identity,  this  "counter-assimilation" also changes their 
loyalties. More and more of them will feel to be Hungarian, 
and as the Moldovan case proved,  changing loyalty has 
dangers. Although the EU did not criticize, and found it 
compatible with the European practice, and Slovakia already 
has  its  own  Status  Law  (which  does  not  caused  any 
tensions) ,  the implementation of this Law must be very 
careful. Acknowledging this,  Hungary proposed continuous 
negotiations between the participants. 
Ethnic issues will remain security concerns, until all 
countries of region become EU members, or form another 
"federation" as was proposed in a secret document, called 
the "Habsburg Plan". The document was found and revealed in 
Romania, and contained a 16-point "schedule" to establish a 
federation between Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, 
Voivodina and the Czech Republic. Romanian sources warned, 
that  some of  these points have already been realized: 
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Slovenia and Croatia are independent, Czechoslovakia 
disintegrated; the next step would be the territorial 
demands of Hungary. At the end, the planners (assumed to be 
Otto Hapsburg and German Intelligence Services) with the 
approval of the Vatican would establish the catholic 
"Danube Confederation". 
This latter example highlights the importance of a 
complex analysis, when drawing up the "security map" of the 
region.  The  emergence  of  new  participants  and  their 
interests  created a very complicated situation  in the 
region. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, they 
found  their  ideas  relevant;  the  disappearance  of  the 
regulatory force, and the weakness of the states further 
stimulated their efforts. One decade after the emergence of 
a power vacuum, this chaos seems to be manageable, and a 
new order is created. States have strengthened, the west is 
making up its mind, therefore the possibilities of the new 
actors are decreasing. Therefore, for example NATO or EU 
enlargement plans with exact time lines and dates would 
have significant stabilizing effects and this is why clear 
statements of decision-makers are so important in East and 
Central Europe today. 
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V.  THE STABILITY PACT: REALIZING IDEAS 
The Stability Pact, initiated in June 1999 by the 
European Union, in order to consolidate the infant 
democracies of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe in 
particular merits a separate chapter of study, because from 
my perspective, this is the first well grounded, effective, 
targeted effort in aiding democratization processes. 
Since 1989, the PHARE program has been the main 
vehicle of EC/EU financial support to assist the economic 
and political Eastern European transition and systemic 
change. The program could have turned into an instrument of 
control, but in contrast to the Marshall Plan, which it is 
usually compared with, it lacked the underpinnings of a 
strong political doctrine95. From the point of view of 
democratization, an even more important deficiency is that 
the main focus of PHARE has been on economic assistance. 
The reason for this has been highlighted by Sedelmeier and 
Wallace, who pointed out that the PHARE program reflected a 
perception of the transformation in Eastern Europe as a 
95 As Ulrich Sedelmeier and Halen Wallace have noted, "PHARE consisted of a 
series of actions... but it did not become a coordinated overall policy" Policies 
towards the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in Helen Wallace and 
William Wallace (eds.): Policy-Making in the European Union, 3rd edition 
(Oxford University Press, 1996. p.361.) 
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predominantly technical problem, solvable through a 
transfer of expertise and financial resources, with the 
main issue and choices focused on the sequencing of 
technical reforms. As a result of this preoccupation with 
'technical' assistance, the idea of using PHARE to support 
the building of new democratic institutions or civil 
society came rather late. Only in 1992-1993 were sub- 
programs financing institution building such as the 
Partnership and Institution Building Program. 
The next important step in mutual relations was the 
creation of second-generation agreements to regulate trade 
regimes. The proposed liberalization of trade was embedded 
in the new Association, or "Europe" agreements, between the 
EU and the new democracies, signed in December 1991 with 
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, in February 1993 with 
Romania and in March 1993 with Bulgaria. 
The Stability Pact was proposed by the former French 
president Edouard Balladur at the Copenhagen European 
Council as early as June 1993. However, it took almost ten 
years to find an answer to the problems of the democratic 
consolidation and its security implications. This process 
was hindered by the euphoria of a few years, when the 
situation looked stable, and no serious intervention seemed 
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to be necessary. Later on, as democratic consolidation 
stopped and reversed in many countries of the region, it 
needed time to evaluate the situation and find the reasons 
for why the 'end of history' has not arrived. At last, in 
June 1999, the EU adopted its initiative called the 
'Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe'. In the founding 
document, more than 40 partner countries and organizations96 
undertook to strengthen the countries of South-Eastern 
Europe "in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, 
respect for human rights and economic prosperity in order 
to achieve stability in the whole region."97 A special 
feature in their relations is that representatives of the 
South-East European countries are, for the first time, on 
equal footing with those of international organizations and 
financial institutions98 for advising about the future of 
their region and in jointly setting priorities concerning 
the content of all three working areas. 
96
 The Stability Pact involves the European Union Member States, the 
European Commission, the countries of the region and their neighbors: Albania, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, 
Yugoslavia and Turkey. The international community also has strong 
representation: as members of the G8, USA, Canada, Japan and Russia, other 
countries (Norway and Switzerland) , IOs, like the UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, 
UNHCR, NATO, OECD, WEU, monetary institutions like the World Bank, IMF, EBRD 
and EIB and regional initiatives (Black Sea Economic Co-operation, Central 
European Initiative, South East European Co-operative Initiative and South East 
Europe Co-operation Process). 
97
 Stability Pact online: Http://www.stabilitypact.org. 
98
 Therefore, the acceptance of the international monetary institutions 
(which required reform countries to introduce shock therapies resulting social 
tensions) by the population and the governments is much higher. 
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The Stability Pact is the first serious attempt by the 
international community to replace the previous, reactive 
crisis intervention policy in South Eastern Europe with a 
comprehensive, long-term conflict prevention strategy". The 
Stability Pact is based on the most important experiences 
and  lessons  from  world  wide  international   crisis 
management. Democratic consolidation,  conflict prevention 
and peace building can be successful only if they start in 
parallel in three key sectors: the creation of a secure 
environment,  the  promotion  of  sustainable  democratic 
systems, and the promotion of economic and social well- 
being. Only if there is progress in all three sectors can a 
self-sustaining process get underway. 
Organizationally, the Stability Pact relies on the 
Special Coordinator and his some 3 0-member team. His most 
important task is to bring the participants' political 
strategies in line with one another, to coordinate existing 
and new initiatives in the region and, thereby, to help 
avoid any unnecessary duplication of work. The Special 
Coordinator chairs the most important political instrument 
of the Stability Pact, the Regional Table. There are three 
Working Tables, which operate under the Regional Table: 
99
 The NATO intervention undoubtedly acted as a catalyst in strengthening 
international political will for coordinated and preventative action in the 
region. 
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• Working Table I: Democratization and Human Rights 
• Working Table II: Economic Reconstruction, Co- 
operation and Development 
• Working Table III: Security Issues (with two Sub- 
Tables: Security and Defense, Justice and Home 
Affairs) 
The European Commission and World Bank were appointed 
to coordinate the economic assistance measures for the 
region. They jointly chair a High-Level Steering Group in 
which the Finance Ministers of the G8 countries and of the 
EU, together with the representatives of international 
financial institutions and organizations and the Special 
Coordinator, work together. 
In the founding document, the EU, which has assumed a 
leading role in the Stability Pact, undertakes to draw the 
region "closer to the perspective of full integration... into 
its structures", including eventual full membership in the 
EU. Even with this hope, the EU promotes stability in the 
region. Countries wishing to be admitted must, however, 
first meet the minimum conditions defined by the Council on 
29 April 1997 concerning democratic, economic and 
institutional reforms. 
The European Union and its Member States are also the 
most important donors of the Pact. As a contribution and an 
interim step towards membership,  the EU set up a new 
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generation of Stabilization and Association Agreements. The 
intention is to increase economic, political and social co- 
operation between the EU and the countries through a new 
instrument, the aid regulation CARDS (Community Assistance 
for Reconstruction, Democratization and Stabilization). A 
financial amount of 4.65 billion Euros will be allocated 
during the years 2000-2006 to accompany and support the 
reforms of the countries concerned. Since 1991, the EU has 
raised over 9 billion Euros through its various aid 
programs100. 
The Stability Pact's stabilization policy is not only 
about economic development. Without state institutions that 
work effectively and the democratic development of a state 
under the rule of law, there can be no long-term economic 
development and prosperity. Equally, democratization and 
non-discrimination are also fundamental preconditions to 
guaranteeing internal and external security. In this 
context, Working Table I has focused on issues such as 
human rights and minorities for the promotion of 
multiethnic co-existence and for the protection of 
minorities, good governance for the development of local 
governments,  the appointment of ombudsmen and women, and 
100
 About financial resources: Http://www.stabilitypact.org 
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the reform of the public administration. There are Task 
Forces to conduct these projects. The Gender Task Force, 
for instance, is devoted chiefly to achieving equality and 
the appropriate representation of women in public life and 
in the political process, while the Education and Youth 
Task Force deals with university education and vocational 
training,  the teaching of history  (school books), youth 
issues  and  democratic  civics.  The  Parliamentary  Co- 
operation Task Force promotes education, exchange, and co- 
operation between members of parliament and their staff. 
The Steering Committee  on Refugee Matters works on a 
package of legal, economic and social measures in Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina designed to assist the return of 
refugees and exiles to their home regions. In June 2000, 
the Regional Table adopted the Media Charter followed by an 
Action Plan with the aim of protecting the independence of 
the media and supporting the training of journalists. In 
October 2 0 00, Working Table I adopted a charter on NGO- 
government partnership in the region. Partners will promote 
the  development  of  NGOs  and  civic  initiatives,  adopt 
appropriate legislation, and promote state-NGO partnerships 
on a sustained and systematic basis. 
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Working Table II conducts the economic reconstruction, 
development, and co-operation projects. In its strategy- 
paper "The Road to Stability and Prosperity in South 
Eastern Europe" in March 2 000, the World Bank formulated 
the medium and long-term economic development goals of the 
Stability Pact101. The goals are defined as follows: private 
sector development102, especially through the liberalization 
of trade between the countries of South Eastern Europe and 
the European Union through the improvement of the business 
regulatory environment and the improvement of the financial 
sector; poverty reduction and social development, 
especially through policies to foster social cohesion and 
inclusion; policies to encourage democratic and 
participatory processes, institutional development and 
governance, especially through the improvement of 
institutional and administrative efficiency and by 
addressing the problem of corruption; increased investment 
101
 With the adoption of the Investment Compact in February 2000, South 
Eastern European countries undertook to introduce free market economy reforms 
and to improve the climate of investment. With the help of the OECD, every 
country drew up a specific list of reforms. In accordance with the deadlines 
specified in the plan of action, implementation started in the Summer of 2000. 
102 The EBRD developed a strategy to promote the private sector, 
particularly small and medium-sized enterprises and those which focus on 
foreign trade. 
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in   infrastructure103; improvements   in   environmental 
protection and policies to strengthen social protection as 
well  access  to,  and the  performance  of,  the  social 
services. 
In January 2000, 20 high-level representatives from 
the European Union, the United States, Canada, Japan and 
South Eastern European countries founded the Business 
Advisory Council, which works, in particular, for the 
improvement of the investment climate in the countries of 
the region, and helps ensure the implementation of the 
Investment Compact. 
The Working Group on Trade is developing measures to 
break down customs barriers and other trade barriers. The 
countries of the region have signed an appropriate 
Memorandum of Understanding. A Coordination Group deals 
with measures to promote vocational training. A Task Force 
is working on the development and the implementation of 
environmental programs. An E-Balkans initiative has been 
developed to help countries in SEE to seize opportunities 
offered by new technologies. The Social Dimension 
Initiative attempts to foster increased access to social 
103
 The European Investment Bank (EIB) presented a comprehensive plan for 
the   development   of   regional   infrastructure   (transport, energy, 
telecommunications and water supply). Preparations have started for a second 
round of infrastructure projects. 
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rights and infrastructures such as social security, health, 
and housing) , social dialogue between governments, 
employers and workers, as well as the creation of 
employment for youth and vulnerable groups in society. A 
financial sector reform initiative has been launched to 
promote cooperation between central banks in the region and 
to foster appropriate conditions for commercial banks. 
Through its two Sub-Tables, Working Table III deals 
with questions of both internal and external security. The 
aim is to establish transparency and predictability and to 
promote regional cooperation in those two areas. Due to 
reductions and reforms in the Armed Forces of Southeast 
European countries, tens of thousands of people are 
becoming unemployed. At the initiative of the Special 
Coordinator, the World Bank and NATO launched a program to 
facilitate the integration of those affected into the 
civilian labor market. In Romania and Bulgaria, the 
implementation of the program has significant results. The 
Sub-Table on Security and Defense mainly deals with arms 
control and non-proliferation104, and the Regional Mine 
Action  Support  Group  is  a  forum  for  coordination and 
104
 Stability Pact partners cooperate to work on issues such as the exchange 
of military information, notification and observation of military activities, 
restrictions on the location of heavy weapons, notification of the dissolution 
of special operations forces, and verification and inspection regimes. 
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information-sharing in the area of mine action between the 
mine-affected countries of the region and other 
participants of the Stability Pact. The Disaster 
Preparedness and Prevention Initiative (DPPI) offers a 
framework for regional cooperation in the field of training 
and response. Working Table III also pursues the objective 
of developing a unified regional approach to fight the 
excessive and uncontrolled circulation of small arms and 
light weapons  in the  region. 
The Sub-Table of Justice and Home Affairs deals 
primarily with measures to fight corruption105 and organized 
crime, for example, support to countries of the region to 
adopt efficient legislation, build up appropriate 
institutions and develop adequate practices for a sustained 
fight against corruption and organized crime; strengthening 
the judiciary in order to improve law enforcement, 
increasing regional cooperation of police forces; improving 
the rule of law and the legal framework regarding migration 
and asylum. 
105
 In February 2000 the Stability Pact partners on Working Table III agreed 
on a comprehensive list of measures to fight corruption. The measures will be 
implemented by the countries of the region on the basis of a definite 
timetable. They will be assisted in doing so by the Special Coordinator's 
staff, the Council of Europe, the OECD, the World Bank, the European Commission 
and the United States. 
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In the implementation of the Stability Pact, important 
lessons are being drawn from the Marshall Plan and other 
post World War II reconstruction programs. Donor processes 
throughout the world have shown that they can be less than 
positive. Up to a third of internationally promised funds 
are never paid. Often, too much time goes by before 
promised financial aid and credits can be released and 
turned into concrete projects. Both donors and aid 
recipients are usually to blame. 
• On the donor side, bureaucratic procedures and 
coordination problems can lead to duplication and 
mismanagement. Also, the priorities set, and 
occasionally by internal policy, by the donors 
are not always congruent with the needs of the 
recipients. As a result, financial loopholes 
often arise in important areas. 
• On the recipient side, on the other hand, there 
is often a lack of the institutional and 
legislative preconditions needed to ensure that 
foreign money is invested in a targeted and 
controllable way. It is also often forgotten that 
every country has only a limited potential for 
absorption in order to avoid distortions such as, 
for instance, corruption or the dependency 
syndrome. 
The  Stability  Pact  therefore  works  as  a  two-way 
street. In order to receive support from the international 
community,  the recipient countries must  first  implement 
appropriate   reforms.   The   South   Eastern   European 
governments,  for example,  have undertaken to carry out 
economic reforms  such as  the dismantling of  trade and 
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investment barriers, and to fight corruption and organized 
crime within the context of the Stability Pact. In 
exchange, the donors have undertaken to support the 
construction process in a coordinated way through 
assistance and credits. 
It is not the amount of the money that is, in the end, 
decisive for the success of aid. Rather, it depends on the 
activities to which the funds are directed. In other words, 
as far as support is concerned, it is not so much a matter 
of "how much" but "what for". The Stability Pact partners 
therefore agreed that first they would set priorities 
regarding content before raising funds and then link 
financial pledges to concise projects. Several hundred 
projects were examined within all three Working Tables in 
advance of the Funding Conference. The projects selected 
were compiled into the Quick Start Package and were 
recommended for funding at the Funding Conference. 
Since the Stability Pact was founded, the Heads of 
State and Government of the South Eastern European 
countries have met regularly for consultation. At the 
Bucharest Summit in February 2000, they adopted a "Charter 
on Good Neighborliness, Stability, Security and Co- 
operation  in  South  East  Europe".  Diverse  cooperative 
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relationships have taken the place of bilateralism. Most 
Stability Pact projects and activities were proposed and 
are carried out by two or more countries of the region. 
The first Regional Funding Conference took place on 29 
and 30 March 2000 in Brussels.  The Special Coordinator 
presented a "Quick Start Package" to the donor community. 
The Package consisted of some 200 projects, from all three 
working Tables, with a value of 1.8 billion Euros. Most of 
the projects in the Package were proposed by the South 
Eastern European countries and in most cases involved more 
than one country. The implementation of the projects was to 
start within 12 months.  At the finance conference,  the 
donor  community undertook to  provide  approximately 2.4 
billion Euros to finance the Quick Start projects. The sum 
pledged exceeded all expectations. Around 1.1 billion Euros 
were pledged by international financial institutions, over 
500 million Euros  from the  central  EU budget via the 
European Commission, and the remainder by bilateral donors 
from the EU, G8 and other countries.  Projects from all 
three Working Tables are now being implemented. For Working 
Table I 460 million Euros has been pledged, and 80 million 
Euros has been pledged for Working Table III. For Working 
Table II, for example, all 35 infrastructure projects, as 
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well as the package for the development of the private 
sector and the Table's environmental projects are covered 
by the money pledged. The return of refugees for example is 
being supported with 3 05 million Euros. To ensure that all 
promises are fulfilled as rapidly as possible, the Special 
Coordinator has created a monitoring and assessment 
mechanism. All project managers carrying out the Quick 
Start projects regularly report to the Special Coordinator 
on the progress of implementation. This information is 
published on the Stability Pact web site. In accordance 
with the resolutions of the Funding Conference, 
infrastructure projects are examined by Working Table II in 
cooperation with the High-Level Steering Group. Additional 
projects can be regularly assessed and proposed for 
financing by the "Donor Network", which was created by the 
Stability Pact. 
The comparison of the Marshall Plan with the Stability 
Pact was a favorite issue, when it was initiated. The 
question of the need of a new Marshall Plan for Eastern 
Europe was always in the spotlight; those who promoted the 
idea argued, that the west made no significant efforts at 
all to finance democratic security, while others explained 
the very different situation of the post-WW starving Europe 
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from the contemporary situation of the reform countries. 
Probably Jeffrey Sachs's viewpoint is the closest to the 
truth; the father of the "shock therapies" emphasized the 
responsibility of the transition countries in shaping their 
policies, but also argued that the west did nothing to help 
them and their unconcern resulted in negative outcomes, 
like the Bosnian ethnic cleansing. He revealed that while 
in 1948-49, the Marshall Plan amounted the 2.1 percent of 
the GDP of the USA, it was only about 0.01 percent (900 
million USD) per year in East and Central Europe during the 
last decade. He also blamed the international financial 
institutions for their mismanagement and lying. While IMF 
emphasizes  its  58  billion  dollar  contribution  to  the 
Russian economic reforms, they forget about the details: 31 
billions  were  gone  immediately  for  paying  just  the 
interests of Russians debts,  18 billions were short term 
loans due in 6 months, a few billions for paying western 
advisors,  only  2-3  billions  reached Moscow.  The  total 
financial  contribution  by  the  G-24  and  the  financial 
institutions for the region were 62.5 billion USD between 
1990-1994, only 13.5 percent of this money was for not- 
refund (85 percent in case of the Marshall Plan)106. 
106
 HVG (World Economy Weekly-Hungarian) May 6, 1994. pp-51-52. 
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The Stability Pact is a viable solution, an effective 
promotion of the democratic consolidation. The late 
initiation of the project have already caused important 
losses, the only way to change the negative tendencies in 
Eastern Europe would be the combination of the Pact and the 
Plan. The Pact should ensure, that the contributions reach 
the recipients and are effectively used, the Plan should 
provide the financial resources, which -since they are 
directed and effectively used- does not necessarily have to 
be irrelevantly high. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Multi-paced democratization causes tensions in East 
and Central Europe.  Multiplying numbers of actors with 
their interests are shaping the processes in the region, 
many of them violating basic democratic rules.  Whether 
these  conflict  resources  will  destabilize  the  post- 
communist facade or liberal democracies will depend highly 
on the democratic consolidation processes.   This    thesis 
focuses on two issues: how to build successful democracies, 
what  went  wrong  in many countries,  and what  kind of 
consequences  these  different  outcomes  may  have.  The 
transitional period of the systemic change seems to be 
deterministic:  well-grounded,  careful  transitions,  with 
enough time to ensure truly democratic change is vital for 
the following,  stable consolidation period. Revolutionary 
or fast changes however created chaotic transitions, facade 
democracies and the alteration of democratic consolidation. 
There are also security consequences of the different 
efficiency   in   building   democracies.   The   "peaceful 
democracy"  theory  emphasizes  that  the  most  successful 
peace-making tool is the promotion of the democratic change 
and consolidation. In this thesis, there are many examples, 
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of how multi-paced democratization processes destabilize 
the region. With the disappearance of the superior, 
controlling -therefore the guardian of security- Soviet 
Union, the region became more complicated, with a lot more 
participants and their multiplied interests. This thesis 
emphasizes the importance of the sub-state level analysis 
to find security risks in this chaotic disorder. The 
security of Europe depends more on individuals, group 
interests, social and cultural processes than NATO-Russian 
relations or landmine treaties. 
Besides the analysis of some happenings in East and 
Central Europe, the thesis provides some lessons learned 
during the last decade; the importance of the slow 
transition, the question of parliamentary versus 
presidential system, the Slovakian and Romanian 
transitions, which are examples for the reversibility of 
undemocratic developments. The Moldovan case, which 
underlines the importance of ethnic issues in 
democratization, the economic lessons, which highlight the 
importance of economic reforms and the mistakes of both the 
relevant countries and the financial institutions... These 
lessons leave a clear mark on the EU"s "Stability Pact" 
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initiative, which gives an answer as to how to promote 
democracies in practice. 
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APPENDIX A. RANKINGS AND CLASSIFICATIONS - EAST 
CENTRAL EUROPE AND CIS 
DEMOCRACY RANKINGS ECONOMY RANKINGS 
Democracy Economy Economy Democracy 
CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACIES CONSOLIDATED MARKET 
Poland 1.44 1.67 Poland 1.67 1.44 
Czech Rep. 1.75 1.92 Hungary 1.75 1.75 
Hungary 1.75 1.75 Czech Rep. 1.92 1.75 
Slovenia 1.94 2.08 Estonia 1.92 2.06 
Lithuania 2.00 2.83 Slovenia 2.08 1.94 
Estonia 2.06 1.92 Latvia 2.50 2.06 
Latvia 2.06 2.50 Lithuania 2.83 2.00 
Slovakia 2.50 3.25 
Mongolia 3.13 3.92 
TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENTS TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 
Romania 3.19 4.17 Slovakia 3.25 2.50 
Bulgaria 3.31 3.75 Armenia 3.58 4.50 
Macedonia 3.44 4.58 Georgia 3.67 4.00 
Moldova 3.88 4.00 Croatia 3.67 4.19 
Georgia 4.00 3.67 Bulgaria 3.75 3.31 
Croatia 4.19 3.67 Kyrgz Rep. 3.83 4.88 
Russia 4.25 4.33 Mongolia 9.92 3.13 
Ukraine 4.31 4.58 Moldova 4.00 3.88 
Albania 4.38 4.50 Romania 4.17 3.19 
Armenia 4.50 3.58 Russia 4.33 4.25 
Kyrgz Rep. 4.88 3.83 Albania 4.50 4.38 
Bosnia 5.13 5.58 Kazakhstan 4.50 5.38 
Kazakhstan 5.38 4.50 Macedonia 4.58 3.44 
Azerbaijan 5.50 5.00 Ukraine 4.58 4.31 
Yugoslavia 5.50 5.33 Azerbaijan 5.00 5.50 
Tajikistan 5.69 6.00 Yugoslavia 5.33 5.50 
CONSOLIDATED AUTOCRACIES CONSOLIDATED STATIST 
Belarus 6.44 6.25 Bosnia 5.58 5.13 
Uzbekistan 6.44 6.25 Tajikistan 6.00 5.69 
Turkmenistan 6.94 6.42 Belarus 6.25 6.44 
Uzbekistan 6.25 6.44 
Turkmenistan 6.42 6.94 
'This year's scores reflect the period through June 1999 
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Foreign debt ($bn) 
Population (m) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996    1997 1998 1999 2000 
33.1 33.4 37.3 38.6 41.5 44.6 45.1     45.6 47.0 48.9 na 
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Indicator 1990    1991    1992    1993     1994     1995    1996    1997    1998     1999    2000 
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Foreign debt ($bn) 
Population (m) 
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Indicator 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Nominal GDP ($bn) 
GDP per capita PPP ($) 
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Indicator 1990    1991    1992    1993    1994    1995    1996    1997 1998 1999 2000 
Nominal GDP ($bn) 
GDP per capita PPP ($) 












Foreign debt ($bn) 
Population (m) 
35.1     28.9     19.6     26.4    31.5     35.7    35.5     34.6 
na        na        na        na   5550   6210   6630   6330    < 
-5.6   -12.9     -8.8       1.5      3.9      7.1      3.9     -6.9 













0.4       3.0       8.2     10.4     10.9       9.5       6.6       8.9 
38.6    97.6    82.6   103.1   109.8   138.3  138.4  121.8 
10.4      11.8 
153    127.7 
10.5 
na 
5.1   170.2  210.4  256.1   136.8     32.3     38.8  151.4 
3.4       3.5       4.3       4.9       6.1       7.9       8.1       8.4 
5.1 4.9       5.7       6.0       6.6     10.3     11.4     11.3 
0.0       0.1       0.2       0.6       1.0       1.2       2.4 
1.2 2.1       3.2       4.2       5.6       5.5       7.2       8.6 
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Foreign debt ($bn) 
Population (m) 
1990 1991 1992 1993    1994    1995    1996    1997    1998    1999 2000 
17.4 12.6 12.5 12.7     14.4     18.7     18.9     18.2     19.6     20.0 18.6 
na na na na 11520 12439 13220 14151 14750 15740 16790 
-4.7 -8.9 -5.5 2.8   5.3   4.1   3.5   4.6   3.8  4.9 4.7 
-10.5 -12.4 -13.2  -2.8   6.4   2.0 1.0   1.0   3.7  -0.5 
na na na na na 
900.2 609.9  627.9 666.1   734.6      945   953.9   901.2   943.7   952.9 
551.6 115 207.3 
4.1 3.9 6.7 
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Foreign direct investment 
stock ($bn) 
Foreign debt ($bn) 
Population (m) 
na na 8.0 13.5 
4490 4069 3720 3299 
13.0     -8.7     -9.9   -14.2 









3900 3576 3339 3333 3310 
-22.9 -12.2  -10  -3.2  -1.7 
-4.8  -6.4 -8.0 















na 50.0 35.4 48.3 54.7 75.3 82.1 67.2 44.4 
91.2 1,210 4,735 
50.0 11.3  12.8 
























































51.7 51.3 51.0 50.5 50.1 49.7 49.3 
105 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
106 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Ash, Timothy Garton: Neo-Pegan' Poland, New York Review of 
Books (Januray 11, 1996) . 
Budapest Papers on Democratic Transition, No. 2. 1991. 
Russett, Bruce: Grasping the Democratic Peace, Princeton 
University Press, 1993. 
Dahl, Robert: Polyarcy: Participation and Opposition, Yale 
University Press, 1971. 
Diamond, Larry: Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation, 
The Johns Hopkins University, 1999 
Doyle, Michael W. : Liberalism and World Politics, American 
Political Science Review, December 1986. 
Fukuyama, Francis: The End of History?, National Interest 
16, Summer 1989. 
Gurr, Ted Robert: Minorities at Risk: A Global View of 
Ethnopolitical Conflicts, U.S. Institute of Peace, 1993. 
Huntington, Samuel P. : The Clash of Civilizations and the 
Remaking of World Order, February 1998. 
Kremer, Mark: Beyond the Brezhnev Doctrine: A new Era in 
Soviet-East Relations?, International Security, (Winter, 
1989-90). 
Linz, Juan J. and Stephan, Alfred: Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation, The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1996. 
Linz, Juan J. : Types of Political Regime and Respect for 
Human Rights: Historical and Cross-National Perspectives, 
Scandinavian University Press, 1996. 
Mansfield and Snyder: Democratization and War, Foreign 
Affairs (no.3. May-June 1995). 
107 
Muravcik,  Joshua:  Promoting  Peace  Through Democracy  in 
Managing Global Chaos, US. Institute of Peace, 1999. 
Powell,  Bingham:  Contemporary Democracies,  Participation, 
Stability and Violence, Harvard University Press, 1982. 
The  Statesman's  Yearbook,  122nd  edition  (edited by J. 
Paxton), London: Macmillan, 1985. 
Tismaneanu, Vladimir: Revolutions of 1989, 1999. 
Przeworski,  Adam:  Democracy  and  the  market,  Cambridge 
University Press, 1991. 
RAND Arroyo Center: Anticipating Ethnic Conflict,  1997, 
Rand Corporation, Santa Monica. 
Wallace, Helen and Wallace, William: Policy-Making in the 
European Union, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, 1996. 
ELECTRONIC RESOURCES 
Collection  of   the   1993-1998   issues   of  HVG   (Heti 
Vilaggazdasag - World Economy Weekly) on CD 
Collection of the 1994-1998 Magyar Hirlap (Hungarian News) 
on CD 
Hungarian News online, http://www.magyarhirlap.hu 
Hungarian Economic Weekly online, http://www.hvg.hu 
International Monetary Fund online, http://www.imf.org 
Journal of Democracy, online: 
http://www.press.j hu.edu/press/j ournals/j od/j od.html 
Stability Pact online, http://www.stabilitypact.org 
Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development 
online, http://www.oecd.org 
Peoples'      Freedom,     Hungarian     daily     online, 
http://www.nepszabadsag.hu 
108 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1.   Defense Technical Information Center 2 
8725 John J. Kingman Road, Suite 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218 
2 .   Dudley Knox Library 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Road 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
3 .   Professor Stephen Garrett  1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
4 .   Professor Tjarck G. Roessler  1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
5. Ministry of Defense, Hungary  1 
Department for Defense Policy 
1055, Budapest, Balaton u. 7-11. 
6. Katonai Felderito Hivatal  1 
Budapest, Pf.: 117 
Hungary - 1502 
7 .   Miniszterelnoki Hivatal  1 
Kul- es Biztonsagpolitikai Allamtitkarsag 
Budapest, Kossuth Lajos ter 4. 
Hungary - 1055 
8 .   Roland Farkas 3 
Budapest, Megyeri u. 222. V/14 
Hungary - 1044 
109 
